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resumo 
 
 
A IoT (Internet of Things) é uma área que apresenta grande potencial
mas embora muitos dos seus problemas já terem soluções satisfatórias, 
a segurança permanece um pouco esquecida, mantendo-se um como 
questão ainda por resolver. Um dos aspectos da segurança que ainda
não foi endereçado é o controlo de acessos. O controlo de acesso é
uma forma de reforçar a segurança que envolve avaliar os pedidos de
acesso a recursos e negar o acesso caso este não seja autorizado,
garantindo assim a   segurança no acesso a recursos críticos ou
vulneráveis. O controlo de Acesso é um termo lato, existindo diversos
modelos   ou paradigmas possíveis, dos quais os mais significativos
são: IBAC (Identity Based Access Control), RBAC (Role Based Access
Control) and ABAC (Attribute Based Access Control). Neste trabalho
será usado o ABAC, já que oferece uma maior flexibilidade
comparativamente a IBAC e RBAC. Além disso, devido à sua natureza
adaptativa o ABAC tem maior longevidade e menor necessidade de
manutenção. A OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards) desenvolveu a norma XACML (eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language) para escrita/definição de políticas de
acesso e pedidos de acesso, e de avaliação de pedidos sobre
conjuntos de políticas com o propósito de reforçar o controlo de acesso
sobre recursos. O XACML foi definido com a intenção de que os 
pedidos e as políticas fossem de fácil leitura para os humanos,
garantindo, porém, uma estrutura bem definida que permita uma
avaliação precisa. A norma XACML usa ABAC. Este trabalho tem o
objetivo de criar uma plataforma de segurança que utilize os padrões 
ABAC e XACML que possa ser usado por outros sistemas, reforçando o
controlo de acesso sobre recursos que careçam de proteção, e
garantindo acesso apenas a sujeitos autorizadas. Vai também
possibilitar a definição fina ou granular de regras e pedidos permitindo 
uma avaliação com maior precisão e um maior grau de segurança. Os
casos de uso principais são grandes aplicações IoT, como aplicações
Smart City, que inclui monitorização inteligente de tráfego, consumo de
energia e outros recursos públicos, monitorização pessoal de saúde, 
etc. Estas aplicações lidam com grandes quantidades de informação
(Big Data) que é confidencial e/ou pessoal. Existe um número
significativo de soluções NoSQL (Not Only SQL) para resolver o
problema do volume de dados, mas a segurança é ainda uma questão 
por resolver. Este trabalho vai usar duas bases de dados NoSQL: uma
base de dados key-value (Redis) para armazenamento de políticas e 
uma base de dados wide-column (Cassandra) para armazenamento de 
informação de sensores e informação de atributos adicionais durante os 
testes.  
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abstract 
 
IoT (Internet of Things) is an area which offers great opportunities and 
although a lot of issues already have satisfactory solutions, security has 
remained somewhat unaddressed and remains to be a big issue.
Among the security aspects, we emphasize access control. Access 
Control is a way of enforcing security that involves evaluating requests 
for accessing resources and denies access if it is unauthorised,
therefore providing security for vulnerable resources. Access Control is 
a broad term that consists of several methodologies of which the most
significant are: IBAC (Identity Based Access Control), RBAC (Role
Based Access Control) and  ABAC (Attribute Based Access Control). In
this work ABAC will be used as it offers the most flexibility compared to 
IBAC and RBAC. Also, because of ABAC's adaptive nature, it offers
longevity and lower maintenance requirements. OASIS (Organization for
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) developed the
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) standard for
writing/defining requests and policies and the evaluation of the requests
over sets of policies for the purpose of enforcing access control over
resources. It is defined so the requests and policies are readable by
humans but also have a well defined structure allowing for precise
evaluation. The standard uses ABAC. This work aims to create a 
security framework that utilizes ABAC and the XACML standard so that
it can be used by other systems and enforce access control over
resources that need to be protected by allowing access only to
authorised subjects. It will also allow for fine grained defining of rules 
and requests for more precise evaluation and therefore a greater level
of security. The primary use-case scenarios are large IoT applications 
such as Smart City applications including: smart traffic monitoring, 
energy and utility consumption, personal healthcare monitoring, etc. 
These applications deal with large quantities (Big Data) of confidential
and/or personal data. A number of NoSQL (Not Only SQL) solutions
exist for solving the problem of volume but security is still an issue. This 
work will use two NoSQL databases. A key-value database (Redis) for 
the storing of policies and a wide-column database (Cassandra) for 
storing sensor data and additional attribute data during testing. 
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1 Introduction 
 Advancements in sensor technology and development tendencies are one of the main 
factors that gave birth and pushed advancements in IoT (The Internet of Things). IoT offers great 
opportunity for possible applications that could and are changing everyday life. This, however, 
comes with many problems and challenges. M2M (Machine to Machine) is a broad area that deals 
with connection and communication issues between constrained devices and because of the 
importance in sensor networks it is essential to IoT. Considering the vast amounts of 
data/information being generated by sensor networks, storage and processing issues fall in  the area 
of Big Data. Big Data is a term that refers to storing, processing, accessing and managing large sets 
of data that are unstructured or semi-structured. NoSQL (Not only SQL) database systems address 
some of the challenges with Big Data. Along with the initial and core implementation problems 
regarding connection, communication, storage and processing of information, which already have a 
number of advancements and usable developments, security is an issue that needs to be addressed 
in order to make the technology safe and will be the focus of this dissertation.  
 Security systems are often overlooked in growing and fast developing areas. It often comes 
as the last issue addressed when a new technology is being developed. Still, it is a necessary 
component and is needed for building systems working in a "real world" environment, without 
compromising safety and confidential information.  
 Smart City projects are one of the biggest and most significant implementation scenarios in 
IoT. Applications include smart traffic control, energy consumption monitoring and management, 
health monitoring and others. Data used by these applications is usually generated by sensor 
networks, people's smart phones or other systems and services like healthcare and education. 
Therefore, the information used is often private or confidential and a security breach or 
unavailability of these services and systems can have significant consequences. The control over 
actuators, sensors and data can be misused if access is given to unauthorised subjects. Because of 
these facts, they must offer greater levels of security and need to implement long term and flexible 
solutions. These problems therefore need to be addressed for the solutions to work in a safe and 
secure manner. Among the security concerns we emphasize access control. 
 Access Control is a broad term and represents a way of securing/limiting access to 
resources so that only authorised subjects have access to. Depending on the implementation, 
resources can anything from data to actions or services.  
 This dissertation will address that problem and propose a solution utilizing Attribute Based 
Access Control (ABAC), the OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
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Standards) XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) standard. It will utilize one 
NoSQL(Not only SQL) database (Redis) for storing policies and another one (Cassandra) for 
storing resources, in this case sensor data. The functionality of a PDP (Policy Decision Point) 
engine and configurable PIP (Policy Information Point) engine will be used from the AT&T 
XACML implementation(AT&T, 2014) open source project. The use-cases that will be considered 
as the target systems for integration are IoT applications in general and SMARTIE (Smart City) as 
a more specific use-case. SMARTIE is a smart city project founded by the EU with PT – Inovação 
e Sistemas as one of the partners. 
 Section 1 is divided as follows: subsection 1.1 contains the official short description text 
along with the objectives, subsection 1.2 will present the problem addressed by this work, in 
subsection 1.3 a short description of the proposed solution will be given, subsection 1.4 will list the 
basic technologies and development environment used and subsection 1.5 will present the structure 
of this dissertation. 
1.1 Dissertation	description	text	
 SMARTIE (http://www.smartie-project.eu/index.html) is a European project where PT – 
Inovação e Sistemas is one of the partners. The project is aimed at creating a framework to collect 
and share large volumes of heterogeneous sensor information (Big Data) to be used in smart city 
applications. In order to protect sensitive data, a security component is necessary to manage 
authentication and authorization which will be based on the XACML standard. The original 
XACML standard is based on XML but in SMARTIE, JSON will also be used because it is easier 
to read and requires less space than the XML format.  
Objectives:	
 This dissertation is focused on the main activity of developing a security framework based 
on ABAC and the OASIS XACML standard.  
To achieve this goal, the following tasks have to be done: 
 Becoming familiar with SMARTIE; 
 Becoming familiar with IoT; 
 Becoming familiar with ABAC models and particularly with XACML; 
 Becoming familiar with NoSQL databases (Big Data); 
 Selecting a NoSQL database to be used to store the collected sensor data; 
 Selecting a database to store the security policies to be enforced; 
 Making a conceptual, logical and physical models for both databases; 
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 Developing a security framework based on XACML. 
All the work is to be developed at Instituto de Telecomunicações facilities in Aveiro. 
1.2 Problem	formulation/description	
 SMARTIE is a Smart City project founded by the European Union and PT – Inovação e 
Sistemas is one of the partners contributing to the development of the project. The goal of the 
project is to create a framework for utilizing sensor networks, storing, processing and managing of 
data and to provide a platform for creating Smart City applications.  
 The notion of storage and processing of large amounts of data needs to be addressed with 
the utilisation of NoSQL databases and related systems. Other than that, security of data is the 
focus of this work. Because the data that will be used in these applications will often be personal or 
confidential, a security framework is needed to provide protection.  
 Access Control is one way of dealing with this. Role Based or Identity Based Access 
Control is the way access control is commonly enforced. The relation between roles and sets of 
allowed actions over resources is intuitive, but a common issue is the explosion of the number of 
roles (Xin Jin, 2012) and the difficulty of the managing aspect for maintaining that type of system. 
Also, there is the issue of somewhat limited possibilities on defining conditions and actions over 
resources. Because of this, they do not offer much flexibility without considerable modifications or 
integrating complex automated processes in the implementations.  
 The OASIS's XACML standard utilizing Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) will be 
explored and utilized in the security component. OASIS is a non-profit consortium that produces 
open standards in the areas of security along with other areas. It defined the XACML standard for 
creating requests, policies and their evaluation in the purpose of managing access to resources. 
Although the initial version of the standard was based on XML, a JSON variant was also created 
and SMARTIE will utilize that variant. This dissertation therefore also focuses on the JSON 
variant. The JSON variant is more memory efficient and easier to read by humans in raw text 
format. The XACML version 3.0 standard has been available since January 2013 but a complete 
and flexible implementation of it has still not been made open source or available in other ways.  
 This dissertation will explore the areas of IoT, M2M (Machine to machine), Big Data, 
NoSQL, Access Control and XACML. The goals can therefore be defined as: becoming familiar in 
the mentioned areas, utilizing a NoSQL database for storing sensor data, creation of a security 
framework for enforcing access control that utilizes the OASIS XACML standard and the 
accompanying NoSQL database for storing policies. SMARTIE is an implementation scenario that 
4 Introduction 
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needs to be considered in the development and testing of the solution but of course should not be 
limited to that use-case. 
1.3 Proposed	solution	
 The proposed solution utilizes a modified version of the architecture from the XACML 
standard (OASIS, 2013) described in subsection 2.1.2, and two proposed general methods for 
implementation/integration with other systems which is described in subsection 4.3. Because of the 
properties inherited from ABAC and XACML, it offers great flexibility for a number of possible 
use-cases, although the primary ones for this work will be IoT applications. The implementation 
and final solution are explained in more detail later in the document, in section 4. Utilizing this 
solution to enforce access control in other systems is done by: implementing a PEP (Policy 
Enforcement Point) component, using a PAP (Policy Administration Point) Web Application for 
creating and uploading of XACML policies, and creating XACML requests. The enforcement is 
done by sending requests to the PEP, which then forwards them for evaluation. The system then 
returns the evaluation result and executes the action in the case of a positive result. If the result is 
negative, the request is terminated. The solution does not implement any advanced actions and 
obligations defined by the XACML standard (OASIS, 2013), it differentiates request results as 
positive and negative and acts as described earlier in this subsection.  
 
Figure 1. High - level overview of the architecture 
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 A high-level overview diagram of the proposed solution can be seen in Figure 1. It shows 
how the solution will be integrated to enforce access control and how will it be used by 
users/system administrators. The framework offers a simple and fast way of integrating access 
control in an existing application by providing two main points of interaction. A policy 
administration point (PAP) that is used for managing (uploading and deleting) policies and an 
enforcement point that needs to be placed at the point where the user wants to enforce access 
control. Because the system uses ABAC and XACML, it is very flexible and allows for having 
complex rules by defining policies around attributes of the subject, resource and environment. 
Compared to systems using  RBAC, this needs less management because there is no need for 
updating roles after certain changes happen with subjects, resources or environmental conditions 
(example: day of the week). As a result, the target system is less prone to security faults over time. 
From the perspective of a target system using this solution to enforce access control, the most 
difficult and critical part is having well and correctly defined XACML policies and requests. The 
policies have to correctly represent the rules and conditions that are being enforced and the 
XACML requests need to accurately representation actual requests (example: fetching data from 
databases or using a services).  
 The solution has two intended ways of being used by other systems. The first possibility is 
putting and running the whole solution on the same place where the enforcement of access control 
needs to be, meaning locally. Compared to the second possibility, this one offers greater security, 
performance, configuration options and overall control. On the other hand, it needs to be 
configured, and at a minimum, it needs to provide a database for storing policies. The second 
possibility would be using the solution as a REST service and communicating with it through a 
secured connection. This is an easier and faster way of utilizing the solution because less 
configuration is needed. The integration scenarios and specifics of the solution will be explained in 
section 4. 
1.4 Development	environment	and	technologies	used	
 The solution was developed mainly using JAVA and Eclipse Luna IDE (Integrated 
Development Environment), version 4.4.2. Components from an open source project (AT&T 
XACML 3.0 implementation (AT&T, 2014)) were used for the XACML functionality it provides, 
along with two NoSQL databases (Cassandra1 and Redis2) and their Java clients. Additionally 
                                                     
1 Apache Cassandra. [Online], Available at: http://cassandra.apache.org/ ,[Accessed 16 February 
2015]. 
2 Redis official website. [Online], Available at: http://redis.io/, [Accessed 20 February 2015] 
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MySQL3 with XAMPP4 and PostgreSQL5 databases were used for initial testing purposes. The 
Axiomatics Alfa6 plug-in for Eclipse was used to help create policies in the initial stages of 
development. Jersey7 and JAX-RS8 libraries were used for creating the REST service and clients. 
Lastly Maven9 was used for solving dependencies, building and exporting issues when having 
multiple projects in Eclipse IDE.  
1.5 Dissertation	structure	
 The structure of this dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the current 
State of the Art along with a critical overview, Section 3 presents background fields and related 
work, Section 4 contains the description of the proposed and developed solution, Section 5 presents 
test results in various test scenarios, proof of concept and discussion for the integration in 
SMARTIE, Section 6 contains the final conclusion and presents potential future work. 
                                                     
3 MySQL homepage. [Online], Available at: https://www.mysql.com/, [Accessed March 2015] 
4 XAMPP. [Online] Available at: https://www.apachefriends.org/index.html, [Accessed March 
2015]. 
5 PostgreSQL. [Online], Available at: http://www.postgresql.org/, [Accessed March 2015]. 
6 Axiomatics ALFA home. [Online], Available at: 
http://www.axiomatics.com/solutions/products/authorization-for-applications/developer-tools-and-
apis/192-axiomatics-language-for-authorization-alfa.html, [Accessed February 2015]. 
7 Jersey homepage. [Online], Available at: https://jersey.java.net/, [Accessed March 2015].  
8 JAVAX-RS. [Online], Available at: https://jax-rs-spec.java.net/, [Accessed February 2015]. 
9 Maven homepage. [Online], Available at: https://maven.apache.org/, [Accessed March 2015]. 
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2 State of the art 
 This section will present areas related to the work done in this dissertation. The overviews 
contain brief descriptions, analysis of the current state and work related to those areas along with a 
future oriented perspective. Firstly, in subsection 2.1, Access Control will be presented. The 
subsection contains descriptions of the most relevant methodologies. It will explain the significance 
of each one, along with giving a brief comparison. Lastly, the OASIS XACML standard will be 
presented with the architecture proposed in the standard, as well as examples of a policy in XML 
and request in JSON format. Subsection 2.2 contains a description of IoT (Internet of Things) 
which is a broad term and is significant for this work as the main use cases targeted by this solution 
are IoT applications. Subsection 2.3 will briefly explain M2M (Machine to Machine) because of its 
importance to sensor networks and therefore IoT. Subsection 2.4 will present the concept of Big 
Data and its relevance to IoT. Subsection 2.5 will present NoSQL (Not only SQL) as a concept, 
present a list of the currently most relevant NoSQL databases, covering each type, and present a 
performance and characteristics comparison overview with figures taken from other sources.  
2.1 Access	Control	
 Access Control is a general term that can be described as a way of securely granting, 
limiting or denying access to resources therefore protecting the resources from potentially 
malicious parties (Vimercati, 2001). In this section, five of the most significant methodologies of 
enforcing access control will be described. A general overview, comparison and evaluation will be 
given and some available solutions will be explored and evaluated. Before continuing, some key 
terms need to be explained as they will be used throughout this work:  
1. Subject - this is a term used for the entity that is trying to access a certain resource. This 
can be a person, but it can also be a process, machine or any other computer system trying 
to access a resource; 
2. Resource/Object - these two terms will both be used and they represent anything that 
access control is being enforced upon. This means that a resource can be data from a 
database, access to an application, service, access to sensors, actuators, facility (room, 
building), actions over resources, etc. This wide definition is needed because of the wide 
variety of use-cases; 
3. Request - this is a term that represents the subject's request for a resource. Along with a 
raw format of a request it can be formatted in some way (example: document, file, string) 
and only represent an actual "physical" request (example: requests for data from a 
database);  
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4. Policy - this term represents one or more rules that the access control system is enforcing 
when evaluating of a request. This can also be formatted in a document or can be 
represented "physically" (example: checking the conditions manually before request 
execution) in the actual implementation.  
 Access control is a security technique that enforces security over resources by limiting 
access to them. The access is given only to authorised subjects which can be people or other 
systems, depending on the implementation. A typical workflow with access control would consist 
of: receiving a request for a certain resource, evaluating the request against one or more policies, 
and allowing or denying the request depending on the evaluation result. The systems enforcing 
access control must have an architecture to facilitate enforcement of access control, an evaluation 
methodology and well defined policies for evaluating the requests. The significance, complexity 
and size of these policies, of course, varies from implementation to implementation and can depend 
heavily on the business layer of the system that is integrating access control.  
2.1.1 Types	of	access	control	
 In this section, some of the most important and significant types of access control will be 
presented. Examples will be shown and a comparisons will be given while presenting each type of 
Access Control. 
DAC	 (Discretionary	 Access	 Control)	 and	MAC	 (Mandatory	 Access	
Control)	
 DAC (Discretionary Access Control) is a type of access control that enforces an evaluation 
criteria (or policy) that mainly restricts access to the resource owner or group, along with all 
control over that resource including granting access to other subjects(Sylvia Osborn, 2000 )(Xin 
Jin, 2012). It is commonly done automatically or indirectly. The users/resource owners, have 
control over the access to the resource. An example would be operating systems. Users that create 
files have ownership over them and can limit access to themselves or allow access to other users. 
DAC is often compared to the MAC.  
File  Owner  Permission for others  User\File  X  Y  Z 
X  Adam  Read  Adam  Read,Write  Read,Write  None 
Y  Barry  Read,Write  Barry  Read  Read,Write  None 
Z  Charley  None  Charley  Read  Read,Write  Read,Write 
Table 1. DAC example: file ownership relation table with permissions (left), resulting matrix with 
allowed actions for every user(right) 
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 Table 1 contains tables which could be used for managing access to files and actions over 
those files. The users that are owners (and usually creators) of the files have total authority over the 
files and can change the permissions for other users over those files. This means that the owner can 
grant or remove Read or Write permissions to any other user. If users try to execute actions over 
files for which they do not have a permission, their requests will be denied. The table on the left, 
contains the column permission for others which can be edited only by the owner. The table on the 
right shows the resulting set of allowed actions for all users over all of the files used in this 
example.  
 MAC (Mandatory Access Control) on the other hand is a type of access control where an 
external entity (usually an administrator) decides on granting or denying access to resources. This 
means that individual subjects cannot change the policies and grant access rights to itself or other 
subjects (Sylvia Osborn, 2000 )(Xin Jin, 2012)(Osborn, 1997). An example would be database 
management systems. They allow access to resources depending on the permissions users have. 
The system administrator has the ownership over all resources and power to grant or remove 
permissions over them. The objects/resources are often divided into multiple categories according 
to the level of security or importance they fall into. This categorisation is often organized as a 
hierarchy. The categories could for example be: Critical, Semi-critical and Non-critical. A 
simplified version would be Private and Public. Furthermore, the subjects would have credentials 
that would reflect the type of actions they can execute. These credentials are therefore permissions 
and the administrator can modify these along with changing the category an object/resource is 
assigned to. 
Object\Subject read and write 
security category levels  LOW,LOW  LOW, HIGH  HIGH, LOW  HIGH, HIGH 
LOW, LOW  Allow, Allow  Allow, Allow  Allow, Allow  Allow, Allow 
LOW, HIGH  Allow, Deny  Allow, Allow  Allow, Deny  Allow, Allow 
HIGH, LOW  Deny, Allow  Deny, Allow  Allow, Allow  Allow, Allow 
HIGH, HIGH  Deny, Deny  Deny, Allow  Allow, Deny  Allow, Allow 
Table 2. Example of MAC permission matrix for READ/WRITE operations 
 In Table 2 an example matrix for MAC can be seen. The HIGH and LOW values represent 
the example security category levels for the objects and subjects for Read and Write operations. In 
this example it can be seen that objects can execute operations only if the level of that operation is 
equal or higher than the level specified for the Object. This allows for the administrator to make 
individual changes for certain resources or types of subjects but also to make global changes at one 
point that can affect all.  
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IBAC	(Identity	Based	Access	Control)	
 IBAC (Identity Based Access Control) is based on giving access to a resource depending 
on a users identity. An example of an IBAC implementation would be having a list of authorised 
users and denying access to every unlisted and therefore unauthorised user. Implementations often 
become RBAC because identities become grouped, the groups then have different permissions or 
can access different resources and therefore they can be viewed as roles(Vincent C. Hu, 2014). 
IBAC can be very fine grained as it can have different permissions defined for every user. In that 
case, it has the downside of being very hard to manage and maintain without having an advanced 
and complex management system. This also means that they are not very flexible. Most adequate 
implementations would be as in the example mentioned before, or password (authentication card, 
fingerprint...) based authentication systems that limit access to a resource which could be an 
account, secure room, traffic service etc (Rui TU, 2009).   
RBAC	(Role	Based	Access	Control)	
 RBAC (Role Based Access Control) is an access control system where users are assigned 
to groups (or roles), which have permissions for accessing resources. An administration entity has 
power over changing access policies for resources. This solution is one of the most popular because 
of the simplicity of the implementation, intuitive way of working, good flexibility and intuitive 
administration. Different roles have different levels of authority. Depending on the implementation, 
the roles can be organized in a hierarchy tree or a simple independent list of roles or 
groups(Vincent C. Hu, 2014)(Ed Coyne, 2013). Almost every website system has a RBAC system 
implemented limiting access to information, changing and adding data, etc. Users are typically 
divided into groups with different levels of access depending on the type of user (buyer, seller, 
visitor...) and administrators are divided into different levels and areas (administrator, moderator) 
for efficient maintaining of the system. A problem that occurs with RBAC it that a large number of 
roles create a hard system to administer and maintain. An administrator needs to have deep 
understanding of all the roles and subjects assigned to these roles to successfully maintain the 
system.  
UsedID  Role  Role  Permissions 
1  Admin  Admin  C, R, U, D 
2  User  User  C, R, U 
3  User  Visitor  R 
4  User 
5  User 
6  User 
Table 3. RBAC example: table containing users and their assigned roles (left), table containing list of 
permitted actions for each role (right) 
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 Table 3 shows an example of the possible types of roles that can be found in a simple web 
site scenario. In the right table the C, R, U and D are taken from the CRUD (Create, Read, Update, 
Delete) acronym, often used in web site terminology. It shows that a user with the role Admin can 
execute all of the possible actions meaning he has authority over all of the content available on the 
web site. The User role does not have a permission for executing a DELETE action. This means 
that any DELETE action that is shown to the user e.g. "delete trash" or "delete image" has to either 
be authorised by the administrator or the resource that is being deleted just becomes hidden, and is 
never deleted. Still, the User role can CREATE and UPDATE content. The User role is adequate 
for registered users. The Visitor role has only READ permissions, therefore it can only view content 
and not create new content. The Visitor role is adequate for all unregistered visitors to a website 
allowing them to view but not to create or change content before they register or sign in. The Table 
3 (left) shows a simple list of 6 registered users, of which one is the administrator. Visitors are not 
registered user so they do not appear in this table. 
ABAC	(Attribute	Based	Access	Control)	
 ABAC (Attribute Based Access Control) is a type of access control that evaluates requests 
against policies according to attribute values(Torsten Priebe, 2006). Attributes are typically divided 
into three categories:  
1. subject - subject/user attributes (examples: age, postal code, IP address...); 
2. object - resource attributes (examples: type, value, age...); 
3. environment (examples: day of the week, hour of the day...). 
 These attributes therefore contain data from the subject trying to access the resource, data 
from the resource that is being accessed and environmental data which represent current conditions. 
When a request is being evaluated, the decision is made according to these values and 
conditions/rules defined in policies. Policies are commonly defined in policy files and contain rules 
and conditions for evaluation. An example policy would be restricting people under the legal age 
limit to apply for a driving licence. The evaluation would require getting the subjects age (or date 
of birth) and the legal age limit which would be an environmental attribute. Only after getting these 
attributes, comparing them and confirming that the subject is over the age limit, the request can be 
allowed. Policies can, of course, also work on a deny principle and define conditions/rules that 
would deny access to certain resources. Keeping close to the previous example, one with a deny 
principle would be defining a policy that would deny access to driving a car (by blocking the car's 
accelerator pedal) if it is detected that a person has a high alcohol level. Policies therefore contain 
rules and conditions that have to be defined and met for a decision to be made after comparing all 
the attributes needed for evaluation.  
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id  name  date of birth  Action  age limit 
1  Person1  1.1.1980.  get driving licence  18 
2  Person2  1.1.2000.  Vote  18 
Table 4. ABAC attributes example: table containing subjects attributes (left), table containing 
environment attributes (right) 
 Table 4 shows an example described before. If the current year is 2015., which can also be 
an environmental attribute, Person1 can both vote and get a driving licence, but Person2 cannot. A 
policy contains that specific rule or a set of rules with conditions that define when access can be 
given or denied. Another example would be a policy that states that a user can add or change data 
related only to accounts that they created and are therefore owners of. This policy would therefore 
stop any unwanted changing of accounts from other users as access would not be allowed. 
 RBAC can be viewed as a subset of ABAC because an ABAC system that has policies 
relying on a single attribute containing the subject's role would be equivalent to a RBAC 
system(Bernard Stepien, 2011). ABAC can therefore be made compliant and integrated in the place 
of any RBAC system, offering more flexibility and easier use of more complex conditions and 
rules(Ed Coyne, 2013)(Vincent C. Hu, 2014). Examples like the one shown in Table 3 can also 
work with ABAC simply by evaluating everything based on the attribute that contains a subjects 
role. The scope of ABAC is therefore larger than RBAC and IBAC, and developing a system 
utilizing ABAC is typically more difficult. Another issue is that the policies that contain the 
conditions are not as intuitive as RBAC, and because of this are more complex for an administrator 
to understand. The maintaining of large RBAC systems usually requires a large amount of "hands 
on" modifications and monitoring or a very complex and well-built system to change and update 
roles automatically. If a user's attributes change or environmental conditions change, a pure RBAC 
system is not flexible to adopt automatically. Although ABAC can be more complex to build, the 
benefit is that it is much more flexible than RBAC. ABAC policies can specifically define which 
actions are allowed on which resources depending on the users, resources and environmental 
attributes. For instance, if a user becomes older than the legal age limit, they can automatically 
have additional access granted without changing the users role. Subjects can also have a role 
attribute to mainly function as a RBAC system, and have policies with attributes as additional 
access control options that can be put in place just by adding a policy. ABAC has its place in 
systems that require a long term solution, complex policies and low maintenance over the policies.  
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2.1.2 OASIS	and	the	XACML	standard	
 OASIS is a non-profit consortium that produces open standards in the areas of security, 
IoT, cloud computing, energy, content technologies, emergency management, and other areas. It 
has more than 5,000 participants representing over 600 organizations and individual members in 
more than 65 countries. The goal of OASIS is to provide standards that offer efficient and open 
solutions for common problems in the areas mentioned before, drive development and building of 
standardized open source solutions that can easily be used by many, therefore accelerating 
innovation and development in general10. 
 XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is a declarative access control 
policy language implemented in XML and created by OASIS. It defines a way to evaluate requests 
for resources according to rules defined in policies. Put simply, it is a thought out and standardized 
solution for implementing access control in software applications(Dan Lin, 2013)(Alex X. Liu, 
2011). It provides a common ground regarding terminology and workflow between multiple 
vendors, building implementations of access control using XACML and interoperability between 
the implementations (Kathi Fisler, 2005,)(Markus Lorch, 2003). It is primarily based on and 
intended for ABAC but can also be used for RBAC, as RBAC can logically be viewed as a subset 
of ABAC as explained earlier in this document (OASIS, 2013)11. Along with the XML version 
there is also a profile utilizing JSON. That profile utilizes the latest 3.0 version of XACML and, as 
stated in the official document of the JSON profile (OASIS, 2014), it is equivalent to the standard 
XML. Requests and responses can be translated in either direction (and back) without any loss of 
information and equivalent requests result in equivalent responses.  
 XML (Extensible Markup Language) is a markup language that is used to format data in 
such a way that it can be readable by both humans and machines. It is defined by a set of rules for 
encoding, documents by the W3C's XML 1.0 Specification. Although the focus of XML's design is 
on documents, it can be and is used for storing various kinds of structured data12. 
 JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a lightweight data-interchange format. Similarly to 
XML, it is readable by both humans and machines. Although it was built around JavaScript, it is 
completely language independent, and it is ideal for mapping information stored in objects (on 
                                                     
10 OASIS official wabsite. [Online], Available at: https://www.oasis-open.org/org, [Accessed 20 
March 2015]. 
11 XACML wikipedia. [Online], Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XACML, [Accessed 20 
March 2015]. 
12 XML wikipedia. [Online], Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML, [Accessed 20 March 
2015]. 
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object oriented languages) or structures, therefore it is best suited for exchanging data between 
languages13. 
 With adding security features to the system, performance if often an issue as big overheads 
can make the system unusable. This means that the security component being integrated into a 
system needs to be optimised and performance issues need to be taken care of. The authors of 
(Miguel L. Pardal, 2012) show that overhead with using XACML can very significant. This, 
depends of the complexity and size of policies, requests and attributes being fetched and used for 
evaluation. On the other hands, they state that regardless of the large overheads in some cases, the 
benefits are still significant enough that XACML is being widely adopted. 
 
                                                     
13 JSON org. [Online], Available at: http://json.org/, [Accessed 20 March 2015]. 
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 Figure 2. Example of a XACML policy 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> 
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" 
PolicyId="smartiedissertation:accesscontrol:policy1" Version="1" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-
algorithm:first-applicable"> 
    <Description>Policy for driving</Description> 
    <Target> 
        <AnyOf> 
            <AllOf> 
                <Match 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
                    <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">drive</AttributeValue> 
                    <AttributeDesignator 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true"/> 
                </Match> 
            </AllOf> 
        </AnyOf> 
    </Target> 
    <Rule RuleId="smartie_dissertation:accesscontrol:policy1:rule1" 
Effect="Permit"> 
        <Description>PERMIT - People over the age limit (18) to 
drive.</Description> 
        <Target/> 
        <Condition> 
            <VariableReference VariableId="13245612653148"/> 
        </Condition> 
    </Rule> 
    <VariableDefinition VariableId="13245612653148"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-
greater-than-or-equal"> 
            <Description>The person accessing is over the age 
limit</Description> 
            <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-one-and-only"> 
                <AttributeDesignator 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:age" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" MustBePresent="false"/> 
            </Apply> 
<!--        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">18</AttributeValue> --> 
            <Apply 
FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-one-and-only"> 
                <AttributeDesignator 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:environment" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:age-limit" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" MustBePresent="false"/>   
            </Apply> 
        </Apply> 
    </VariableDefinition> 
    <Rule RuleId="smartie:dissertation:accesscontrol:policy:rule:default" 
Effect="Deny"> 
        <Description>DENY - default.</Description> 
        <Target/> 
    </Rule> 
</Policy> 
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 In Figure 2 an example of a XACML policy can be viewed. Simply explained, this policy 
manages access to a resource that is an action, in this case a "drive" action. The target (defined in 
inside the Target) therefore are all requests that ask for access for the "drive" action. The policy 
contains a rule (stated in the Rule, Condition and finally in the VariableDefinition with the 
VariableId="13245612653148" part) which states that, if a subject's age subject:age needs to be 
greater or equal than the environmental variable environment:age‐limit. The default result of the 
evaluation of this policy is Deny and is allowed only if all of the conditions are met. The 
MustBePresent="false" values in the environment:age‐limit and subject:age means that that if 
the original request does not contain these values,o the PDP can contact a PIP to fetch them. 
{ 
  "Request" : { 
  "AccessSubject" : { 
    "Attribute" : [ 
           { 
             "Value" : 25, 
             "DataType" : "integer", 
             "AttributeId" : "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:age"                 
           }, 
           { 
             "Value" : "SubjectName", 
             "AttributeId" : "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:name"                
           } 
         ] 
    }, 
    "Action" : { 
        "Attribute" :  
         { 
            "Value" : "drive", 
            "AttributeId" : "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action‐id" 
          } 
    }, 
    "Resource" : { 
        "Attribute" : [ 
           { 
            "Value" : "Porto", 
            "AttributeId" : "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource‐id" 
           } 
     ] 
    } 
  } 
} 
Figure 3. Example of a XACML request in the JSON format 
 In Figure 3 an example of a request in JOSN format can be seen. The JSON format of 
XACML is somewhat easier to read and is less cluttered than the original XML variant. This 
request simply states that it wants to execute the action drive on a resource with the id Porto. If 
the age limit is lower or equal to 25, this request will pass and will be allowed. 
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Figure 4. Architecture proposed by the OASIS XACML standard (OASIS, 2013)  
 Figure 4 shows the architecture proposed in the OASIS XACML standard. The 
components are as follows: 
 PEP (Policy Enforcement point) - component that performs access control by performing 
the decision provided by the response. This may also mean fulfilling obligations that come 
in the response; 
 PDP (Policy Decision Point) - this component is responsible for evaluating the request 
against a policy. It contains all the functionality to make the evaluation and produce a 
response; 
 PIP (Policy Information point) - This component is responsible for retrieving attributes. 
The attributes are split into three types: subject, environment and resource attributes; 
18 State of the art 
 
18 | P a g e   
 PAP (Policy Administration Point) - the policy administration point contains the 
functionality required for managing policies. Typically this means adding and removing 
policies; 
 Context Handler - this entity controls the workflow of the system. It communicates with 
the PEP, PDP, PIP and resource;  
 access requester - entity that is requesting a resource; 
 obligations service - service that executes any obligations after the evaluation is complete. 
Obligations are directives given by the PDP to the PEP on what has to be done before 
and/or after access is given to the subject. These obligations are decided upon by the PDP 
while evaluating requests against policies;  
 resource - entity containing one or more resources and resource attributes that the access 
requester is trying to access; 
 subjects - entity containing subject attributes. Typically the subject attributes are attributes 
of the access requester.  
 environment - entity containing one or more environmental attributes. 
One other component that should be mentioned as it was part of the architecture in version 1.0 of 
the standard and will be relevant for the work described later in this dissertation is the PRP. 
 PRP (Policy Retrieval Point) - component used for retrieving of policies. In version 1.0 it is 
used to provide the PDP with policies unlike in version 3.0, as shown in Figure 4, which 
uses the PAP for that purpose  
The removal of a PRP from the new architecture and having that functionality integrated in to the 
PAP could bring issues. As the PAP has functionalities to change or delete a policy and is included 
in the workflow of requests evaluation, a possibility of policy modifications or deletion exists while 
receiving requests for evaluation. By having the PRP included in the workflow of evaluation and 
removing the PAP from the workflow, this is no longer an issue. Because of this, the final solution 
has an architecture that is different and will be addressed in section 4.  
 One significant beneficial characteristic that is a result of this architecture and workflow is 
that the initial request that originates from the access requester does not need to contain all of the 
attributes needed for evaluation. It therefore does not need to be aware of possible services and 
other entities that need to be contacted by the PIP for getting additional attributes. This also means 
that there is no need to rely on the entity requesting access to include all required attributes 
correctly. From an implementation perspective this should result in a system that is easier to 
integrate. Also, this means that it is more secure as the PIP is an internal component and can be 
trusted more than an entity requesting access.  
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2.2 The	Internet	of	Things	(IoT)	
 In this subsection the current state of IoT will be presented. The main areas that will be 
briefly presented and analyzed are: current state and overview, general concerns, recent work and 
studies, technologies used, implementation examples and expected future developments. 
 The IoT is a recent paradigm in the area of networks and communication that has had a lot 
of growth and new developments in recent years(Angelo Cenedese, 2014)(Du Jiang, 
2010)(Jayavardhana Gubbi, 2013.)(Andrea Zanella, 2014). Although there are many definitions of 
the IoT (Lu Tan, 2010)(Angelo P. Castellani, 2010) and the somewhat changing and branching 
nature of the development trends in this area, the basic and simplified idea of this concept is that 
nowadays everyday objects can be equipped with cheap microcontrollers, sensors, means of 
connecting to one another and the Internet (Lu Tan, 2010)(Angelo P. Castellani, 2010). The devices 
can generally be divided into two categories: sensors and actuators, meaning that their purpose is to 
provide and share data or some kind of readings or to receive commands and react/complete 
actions accordingly. The overall implementation of this could be utilized in a number of 
applications including: home automation, industrial automation, medical aids, mobile health care, 
elderly assistance, intelligent energy management and smart grids, automotive, traffic management 
and many others (Luigi Atzori, 2014)(Luigi Atzori, 2010)(Andrea Zanella, 2014)(Angelo P. 
Castellani, 2011). All of these offer beneficial and significant impact on almost all areas of 
everyday life and have potential for providing advancements in research areas unrelated to 
networking and computer science. The definition of IoT is not exact as the authors of (Luigi Atzori, 
2010) wrote. They explain that the two main views that come from the name "Internet of Things" 
and an additional one that is a result from recent tendencies in IoT developments. One vision views 
the concept from a network perspective concentrating on communication and connection problems 
while the other is oriented on the "Things" or object perspective concentrating on sensor 
technologies, new communication technologies like RFID and integration into other devices in a 
seamless and affordable way. The third view, which the authors defined as a "Semantic oriented 
vision" is concentrated more on the use, implementation and processing of data. 
 A number of challenges are in the way of successfully building and utilizing the IoT(Luigi 
Atzori, 2010)(Luigi Atzori, 2014). Scalability is one of the obvious challenges(Luigi Atzori, 2010). 
Any kind of IoT application that requires a large number of devices commonly face problems with 
response time, memory, processing and energy constraints. Other challenges include security 
issues. The data being generated by sensor networks is huge and could over saturate the network, it 
could be personal and as such has to be protected from unwanted access. Attacks by hackers, 
malicious software, viruses and other sources can also disturb the flow and integrity of 
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data/information. The authors of (Qi Jing, 2014))(Hui Suo, 2012)(S. Sicari, 2014)(Prasant Misra, 
2015) describe and stress the importance of security for a widely acceptable solution. They divided 
IoT into 3(Qi Jing, 2014)) or 4(Hui Suo, 2012)(Prasant Misra, 2015) layers and define security 
requirements for every layer providing the current state of technologies used in these areas. They 
stress the need for a uniformed and standardised open architecture and solution. Solutions for many 
of these problems are already conceptually known (Andrea Zanella, 2014)(Angelo P. Castellani, 
2011)(Luigi Atzori, 2010)(Qi Jing, 2014))(Hui Suo, 2012)(S. Sicari, 2014) and are in some 
examples implemented (Angelo Cenedese, 2014)(Sachin Babar, 2011)(Razzak, 2012) but the lack 
of an open and standardized solution is certainly an issue that would prove to be beneficial if/when 
created. 
 Technological advancements in various sensor modules and cheap and energy efficient 
microcontrollers along with recent communication technologies like RFID and network protocols 
are the main factors that enabled the fast development and spreading of the IoT (W. Colitti, 2011 ). 
Because of these advancements, the concept became a reality and is gaining importance. As the 
means of connection and communication are open and utilize a number of technologies (e.g., 
RFID, WiFi, 4G, IEEE 802.15.x)(S. Sicari, 2014), the growing number of networks and devices 
bring up more issues with security, data integrity and scalability. Standardisation of some aspects 
regarding communications and security enforcement could solve many of these problems but 
brings with itself the issue of wide acceptance and implementation.  
 A more future oriented view and analysis is provided by (Prasant Misra, 2015)(Michele 
Zorzi, 2010). It describes a more human centric rather than thing centric future of the IoT. Devices 
being linked to people and monitoring their state and condition. Others are used for monitoring or 
controlling things in the environment but always in close relation to human needs and/or wants. It 
describes a need for IoT applications to provide better quality of service and seamless integration 
into areas of life. The more relevant and faster growing application domains are: Environmental 
Monitoring, Smart Retail, Smart Agriculture, Smart Energy and Power Grids and Smart 
Healthcare.  
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Figure 5. A High level reference architecture for IoT(Prasant Misra, 2015) 
 The architecture proposed is separated into 4 layers and the application, which utilizes the 
lower layers for the purpose of providing a service. The layers are stacked one on top of another 
and organized in this order and a diagram is shown in Figure 5: 
1. Things - containing devices or elements that are data generators and/or consumers of 
information. The devices could range from small and unintelligent embedded systems to 
complex devices or virtual entities. The communication would be done over different 
communication technologies and a wide variety of protocols; 
2. Network - this layer contains functionality and means of managing a sensor network.  
Discovery of new devices, maintenance, scalability, universal abstractions of the Inputs 
and Outputs. Additionally it contains a general abstraction for the upper and lower layers 
and enabling plug-n-play like use, using already known models like push/pull or 
publish/subscribe models; 
3. Data Management - it is defined as "Big-Little" Data Management referring to the data 
usually generated by sensor networks meaning that the data generated by for instance 
temperature sensors is small in individual reading size and large considering a large 
number of sensors over a period of time. This layer is responsible for categorizing and 
aggregating data retrieved from the Network layer in order for it to be used and/or by the 
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Analytics layer. Data generated by sensors is often slow changing (Prasant Misra, 2015) so 
this fact should be taken advantage of for more efficient data storage:  
4. Analytics - this layer mines/retrieves data from the Data Management layer and performs 
data processing and analysis depending on the type of data and end user of the result. It 
provides the applications (which would be located on top) with useful data and 
information for subsequent use. 
 There are lot of commercial implementations of IoT on a smaller scale which are mainly 
focused on personal use in home energy consumption(Sean Dieter Tebje Kelly, 2013)(Baoan Li, 
2011), health monitoring(Byung Mun Lee, 2014)(Sara Amendola, 2014) and environment 
monitoring applications(Sean Dieter Tebje Kelly, 2013). These usually utilize custom solutions 
along with custom hardware (regarding the sensor devices). Introducing standards that would be 
accepted and the creation of publicly available frameworks that utilize those standards would be 
very beneficial and would ease further developments. The lack of said standards and frameworks 
mean that during initial developments of applications, many of them face the same problems and 
implement a custom solution. This leads to incompatibility issues and stand in the way of a truly 
global IoT. The surveys and proposals given in (S. Sicari, 2014)(Qi Jing, 2014)) give a good 
overview of the current situation in IoT and a give proposals for a more uniformed future research 
and developments.  
2.3 Machine	to	Machine	communication	(M2M)	
 This section will provide a brief overview of the current state, issues and a future 
developments in M2M (Machine to machine). M2M refers to the technologies used for 
communication between devices. It is a broad term that can sometimes be used for terms like 
"Machine to Mobile" and "Man to Machine" which mainly refer to the implementation in a more 
precise manner. It is also commonly regarded in the context of IoT because it is essential part if 
IoT. IoT concentrates more on a higher overview considering network problems and viewing object 
in a more general way, while M2M deals more with one-to-one communication between devices 
and the functioning of devices regarding one another, less regarding the overview from a network 
perspective14.  
The motivation behind M2M comes as stated in (Min Chen, 2014) and can be shown using three 
observations:  
1) a networked machine is more valuable than an isolated one; 
                                                     
14 Wikipedia M2M. [Online], Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine_to_machine, 
[Accessed 16 February 2015.]. 
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2) when multiple machines are effectively interconnected, more autonomous and intelligent 
applications can be generated; 
3) smart and ubiquitous services can be enabled by machine-type devices intelligently 
communicating with other devices at anytime and anywhere. 
M2M systems are mainly used in the areas of personal health monitoring and smart homes/smart 
houses (Min Chen, 2014) (Xiao Nie, 2013)(David S. Watson, 2004). M2M communication can be 
achieved with a number of technologies but the most significant and most promising ones are 
wireless technologies. In (Min Chen, 2014) the main technologies that are mentioned and reviewed 
are: Zigbee, Bluetooth, UWB, IEEE 802.15.6, Wi-Fi, HomeRF, 60GHz transmission and Visible 
light communications(Dominique Guinard, 2010). They offer easy integration of devices and many 
options for developing application. Trends in M2M as mentioned in (Min Chen, 2014) suggest an 
exponential growth in the number of M2M-enabled devices. From 50 million in 2008 and over 200 
million in 2014, it is expected to grow up to 50 x 109 in 2020. Along with communication and 
integration challenges, security is one of the more important areas that need to be dealt with 
regarding M2M.  
The architecture of M2M systems can generally be divided into 3 layers: 
1) Terminal layer - contains the access gateway, M2M nodes, M2M enabled devices; 
2) Network layer - responsible for transmitting data between the other two layers; 
3) Application layer - contains the application that utilizes the M2M system. 
 Security issues in M2M systems are similar to ones found in providing security and privacy 
in communication over other networks. Additional, problems that are more specific to M2M occur 
in the Terminal layer. Devices could potentially be easily accessible to attackers. This means that 
they could be tampered with or be controlled by attackers and false data could be injected 
threatening the overall performance of the M2M system and application. This was, of course, only 
one simple example of a potential attack scenario among many other possible ones.  
 M2M systems in the IoT context provide the means to build applications that can further 
the developments in many scientific areas along with bettering personal quality of life. Solving 
security issues and the general standardisation of undefined aspects in communication, as well as 
the development of quality and publicly availably solutions are the future steps that will enable the 
wide commercial use of these technologies.  
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2.4 Big	Data	
 Storing, processing, accessing and managing vast amounts of complex or unstructured data 
all fall in the term Big Data. Although the term refers only to a large amount of data, the challenges 
that come with handling, using and processing of it also come hand in hand with this term. Same as 
M2M, Big Data is often referred to, together with IoT as IoT applications typically generate and 
need to process a large amount of data(Min Chen, 2014). These challenges are addressed by Big 
Data.   
 Big data is often described with the 4 or 5 Vs of Big Data (depending on different sources) 
as can be seen in the works of (Roshni Bajpayee, 2015)(Rajendra Kumar Shukla, 2015) and in 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. The 5 Vs of Big Data15 
 Volume - refers to the amount of information or data that is being generated and needs to 
be handled. Because of the sheer amount or type (data without a defined structure), 
traditional systems (referring to RDBMS) do not offer appropriate solutions, so different 
methods need to be taken into account. The authors of (Roshni Bajpayee, 2015) predict that 
the size of the data being generated to reach the range from terabytes to petabytes; 
 Variety - refers to the data's structure. It can vary from a traditional sense of well-
structured and predictable data, to semi-structured, unstructured and/or changing data, 
coming from a variety of resources like Documents, email, Web Pages, Sensor Networks, 
Social Media etc;  
                                                     
15 Google Images. [Online], Available at: http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-
4sM6wRgPBUA/T9FiKnMhNFI/AAAAAAAAACc/bOO8PGQ0rDs/s1600/BigData+-
+V5+Lens.JPG, [Accessed 17 February 2015]. 
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 Velocity - refers to the rate of data flow. This is quite an open definition encompassing 
both the rate of data coming from different sources, but also rate of data flow in general;  
 Variability - refers to the inconsistence of data flow in general. This is an issue that is hard 
to deal with and is best understood when thinking of the usage of social networking; 
 Value -refers to the fact that a user can run certain queries against the data stored and then, 
get important results from the filtered data obtained, and rank it according to the 
dimensions.  
 Complexity - The authors of (Roshni Bajpayee, 2015) also added Complexity to this as an 
important and sometimes forgotten aspect referring to the complexity of linking, matching, 
cleansing and transforming of data which is coming from various sources.  
 The authors of (Min Chen, 2014)(Alexandros Labrinidis, 2012)(Surajit Chaudhuri, 2011) 
discuss and present the challenges of Big Data. The main challenges can be listed as follows: 
 Data representation - data has to be represented in a way that can be meaningful for 
computer analysis and user interpretation. It also has to be efficient and should retain as 
much information as possible so the data does not lose value. It effects the structure, 
granularity, organisation, accessibility, etc. Different data representation is suited for 
different types of data; 
 Redundancy reduction and data compression - datasets typically contain a high percentage 
of redundant data. This redundancy diminishes performance and requires more resources 
(memory and processing power). For example: most sensor networks generate highly 
redundant data. The data either changes slowly or in increments. The data can therefore be 
compressed and filtered. The changing from one increment to another can be used as a 
relevant event and stored; 
 Data life cycle management - although systems that can support large quantities of data 
already exist, their limits can be breached by some applications. This means that some data 
has to be archived. As the relevance of data in most use-cases, it is dependent on how old 
the data is, a mechanism determining the importance of data needs to be put in place to 
determine what can be archived;  
 Analytical mechanism - data needs to be analyzed in a limited timeframe. The amount of 
data is often huge and the data is often distributed over several clusters of machines. 
Distributing the data smartly and taking advantage of caching and in memory databases 
are being used for improving performance (Min Chen, 2014); 
 Data confidentiality - data that is stored can be confidential therefore security measures 
need to be taken before either raw data or analysis results are delivered to a third party;  
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 Energy management - increasing volumes and the need for more storage, data 
transmission and processing power require growing energy needs. This is an mainly an 
economic issue that could slow down fat and large scale developments; 
 Expendability and scalability - systems need to support long term storage needs and 
increasingly more complex datasets. This has to be achieved without losing performance; 
 Cooperation - this refers to the cooperation with scientists, researchers and experts from a 
variety of field to harvest the maximum potential of Big Data. A comprehensive data 
network architecture could aid in many different fields of research.  
 Along with fundamental challenges in Big Data, regarding functional issues, security has to 
be taken into account if implementations are to be realized. The biggest security challenge in Big 
Data is as identified in (Lafuente, 2015) is the protection of user's privacy. Vast amounts of 
personal identifiable information (PII) that are stored in unstructured databases (NoSQL), which 
means that the location of all information is not always known unambiguously and even direct 
access is somewhat abstracted. Leaving everything as is and without applying security measures 
such as Access Control leaves things open for abuse.  
 Big data has had significant breakthroughs in the form of NoSQL database management 
and processing systems these will be looked in more detail in subsection 2.5.   
2.5 NoSQL	Databases	
 NoSQL, or otherwise known as "Not only SQL", refers to databases or data management 
systems which are designed to handle data management problems where conventional RDBMS 
solutions cannot cope for various reasons(Ken Ka-Yin Lee, 2013)(Roshni Bajpayee, 2015). These 
problems are usually related to: handling large amounts of unstructured or semi-structured data and 
processing it, high number of operations, specific types of operations or needs. Commonly, NoSQL 
systems are designed for large scale data storage and parallel processing over a large number of 
servers. Some systems provide APIs that support SQL or SQL-like languages and convert them 
into native non-SQL languages and use mechanisms different to ones in RDBMS (Relational 
Database Management System) systems. RDBMS systems usually have ACID (Atomicity, 
Consistency, Isolation, Durability) characteristics. 
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ACID characteristics stand for:  
 Atomicity - ensures that a transaction and all of its actions and consequences will execute 
either in its entirety or fail. This therefore means that transactions cannot be split or 
executed partially; 
 Consistency - ensures that a database has to be in a valid state before and after a transaction 
executes, but it does not ensure the correctness of the transaction. 
 Isolation - ensures that the result of executing transactions concurrently, is equal to the 
result when executing the same transactions serially. This also needs to persist even in the 
case of transactions failing;  
 Durability -this ensures that for every transaction that has been committed, the results of it 
will still persist, even in the case of a system failure. For example: crashes, errors, power 
outages, etc. 
 BASE (Basically Available, Soft-state, Eventually consistent) characteristics, on the other 
hand do not force or guarantee consistency. It is somewhat an optimistic view and accepts that the 
database is "eventually consistent". These loose characteristics can be beneficial for replication and 
partition characteristics, therefore it is suited for massively distributed systems. 
 Because RDBMS systems provide the ability to handle large amounts of data it usually 
comes at the price of fully ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) characteristics. 
This can be explained by the CAP (strong Consistency, high Availability, Partition tolerance) 
theorem which can be seen in more detail in (A B M Moniruzzaman, 2013), and because of this 
most systems can be described as BASE.  
 
Table 5. CAP theorem diagram 
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 The CAP diagram, also known as "Brewer's theorem", describes the relation between 
Consistency, Availability and Partition tolerance characteristics. It shows that it is impossible to 
have all of the characteristics without significantly sacrificing one. Table 5 shows this and also 
gives examples of databases management systems and where they fall into. RDBMS systems are 
not appropriate for Big Data applications because of the lack of partition tolerance. NoSQL 
typically have partition tolerance but then differ from one another regarding Availability and 
Consistency characteristics.  
 A new trend in database technologies development is NewSQL(Katarina Grolinger, 2013). 
This is a new paradigm that is a middle-ground between RDBMSs and NoSQL systems. The basic 
approach is building a RDBMS that can scale as a NoSQL database therefore having the best 
characteristics of both. The goal is to have database management system with16: SQL as a primary 
interface, ACID support for transactions, non-locking concurrency control, high per-node 
performance and scalability that is equal of better compared to NoSQL systems. Although there are 
already some open source solutions available and it is definitely a trend, it is still in its early stages 
so NewSQL may be more significant in the near future. Some of the most significant NewSQL 
databases are (Glushkov, 2015)(Katarina Grolinger, 2013): VoltDB, Clusterix, NuoDB, TokuDB 
and ScalaDB. 
2.5.1 Types	of	NoSQL	databases	
NoSQL databases can be classified in four basic categories as done in (A B M Moniruzzaman, 
2013). 
1. Key-Value stores; 
2. Document databases (or stores); 
3. Wide-Column (or Column-Family) stores; 
4. Graph databases. 
Key‐Value	stores		
 These storage systems are organized in simple, standalone tables, most similarly to "hash 
tables". The items stored in tables are key-value pairs where the key is an alpha-numeric identifier 
and the value is one or a set of values associated with that identifier. As the organisation of a table 
is a "hash table" the limitation that is presents is that they are usually only "exact match" type of 
                                                     
16 Glushkov, I., 2015. http://www.slideshare.net/. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.slideshare.net/IvanGlushkov/newsql-overview 
[Accessed June 2015]. 
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queries or allowing while "<,>" type of operations can be executed with a significant reduction in 
speed. On the other hand, read operations are very fast, as to be expected from a hash table data set. 
Because the keys can also be viewed as the addresses of the value wanted to be retrieved, even data 
from the same table can be distributed over several locations so these storage systems possess 
linear characteristics regarding scalability. Data is typically partitioned horizontally, meaning that 
sets of rows can be separated and distributed over many locations. Availability is typically high and 
achieved trough data replication.  
Document	databases		
 Document based storage systems, as their name implies, are designed to store data in 
documents. They use standard data exchange formats such as XML, JSON or BSON (Binary 
JSON) to store the data in documents and they can distribute these documents over multiple 
locations. These are considered to be semi-structured databases because the storage format or 
storage data structure can be loosely defined. Single columns or single data entries can house 
hundreds of values and the number or type of values stored can vary from row to row. These are 
good for storing and managing big collections of documents containing significant amounts of data 
like text documents, emails, XML documents or objects containing large amounts of values and 
data. Along with that they are also convenient for storing sparse data collections because of their 
semi-structured data structure. This means that the usual filling out with null values (that is 
traditionally done in RDBMS) is not necessary and means that the overall amount of space used is 
correlated to the amount of data stored inside the database. These solutions offer great scalability, 
unlike key-value based stores allow multiple "< >" types of comparators and both keys and values 
are fully searchable.  
 MapReduce is a term commonly used for operations that are used for processing and 
generating large data sets with a parallel, distributed algorithm on a cluster. Although document 
databases can offer MapReduce17 features they tend to have slow response times to queries. This 
reason for this is because fetching data with multiple set parameters for values means reading and 
parsing data from whole raw documents, which are typically heavy operations (e.g. they require a 
lot of processing).  
 	
                                                     
17 MongoDB HomePage. [Online], Available at: http://www.mongodb.org/, [Accessed 7 February 
2015]. 
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Wide‐Column	Stores	
 Wide-Column (or Column-Family) stores are somewhat in between document based and 
key-value based storage systems. Unlike key-value, wide-column databases store and process data 
according to columns(Min Chen, 2014). They have a structure similar to a key-value structure but 
allow multiple values and require at least one identifier column which fills the role of a primary 
key. They can form multiple indexes upon other values and allow "equal type" comparisons over 
the value attributes. Because of the similarity to key-value based systems they share the same faults 
regarding "< >" types of operations. Both columns and rows can be segmented therefore wide-
column based databases have good scalability characteristics. Additionally, both the rows and 
columns can be expanded allowing for storage of data with inconsistent structure (e.g. unstructured 
or semi-structured data). Reading and writing operations are fast so they are specially suited for 
MapReduce operations and parallel processing of large amounts of data which is their main 
purpose and use.  
Graph	Databases		
 Graph databases, by basic concept are relational databases but still are very different from 
typical RDBMS'. The relations themselves can be considered as more important because these are 
used when we mainly need to store data regarding the relationships and dependencies between 
objects rather than information about the objects themselves. Unlike other NoSQL database types, 
which support BASE properties, graph databases typically support fully ACID transactions. They 
store data similar to object-oriented databases as they use objects as network nodes that have 
relationships (edges) and properties or object attributes stored as key-value pairs. The relationships 
can also have different attributes or properties attached to them. Because of the emphasis on 
relations between objects or nodes, they are suited for storing and visualizing data regarding 
graphs, networks etc.  
2.5.2 Current	state	of	NoSQL	technologies	
 This section contains an overview of the current "popular choices" in NoSQL data storage 
and management systems, a brief comparison given from results provided by outside sources and 
general conclusion.  
Hadoop	
 Hadoop is an important platform for NoSQL as many of the most popular NoSQL 
databases are built on top of it(Min Chen, 2014)(Roshni Bajpayee, 2015) (Rajendra Kumar Shukla, 
2015). Because of this, many of these solutions are compatible with one another and therefore offer 
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a large and very powerful ecosystem of databases and data processing solutions. Hadoop is an 
Apache project and was created as a platform for developing open-source software for solving 
scalability and processing problems in the context of large quantities of data. Hadoop is mainly a 
file storage system that is designed to reliably store large amounts of data, distributed over large 
clusters, and to stream data to those who need it with high speed and efficiently. The work from 
(Konstantin Shvachko, 2010) mentioned that in 2010, Yahoo! used it to manage 25 petabytes of 
data. The platform has a large developer community and many open projects and because of that it 
is one of the biggest and fastest evolving platforms. On the Hadoop website it is stated that "The 
Apache Hadoop project develops open-source software for reliable, scalable, distributed 
computing". It is also stated that it is essentially a framework that allows distributed processing 
across clusters of computers, it is designed for scalability and can easily be scaled from one server 
to thousands of machines, it handles failures on the application layer and as a result provides a 
highly-available service on top of clusters, regardless of individual failures on machines inside the 
cluster.  
These are the projects main modules as stated on its official webpage18: 
 Hadoop Common: The common utilities that support the other Hadoop modules; 
 Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS™): A distributed file system that provides high-
throughput access to application data; 
 Hadoop YARN (Yet Another Resource Negotiator): A framework for job scheduling and 
cluster resource management; 
 Hadoop MapReduce: A YARN-based system for parallel processing of large data sets. 
                                                     
18 Apache Hadoop. [Online], Available at: http://hadoop.apache.org/, [Accessed 7 February 2015]. 
32 State of the art 
 
32 | P a g e   
 
Figure 7. Hadoop HDFS Architecture19 
 Figure 7 shows the architecture of an HDFS cluster. It is a master/slave architecture and 
consist of a single NameNode and a number of DataNodes. Both are pieces of software designed to 
run on commodity machines which typically run a Linux operating system. The NameNode is a 
master server responsible for managing the namespace and regulates access to files by clients. It 
determines mapping options for the DataNodes and it can execute file system namespace 
operations. DataNodes are responsible for managing data storage attached to the nodes they are 
running on. They perform actions over blocks and are responsible for serving read and write 
operations for the systems clients. The system is greatly simplified because of the existence of a 
single NameNode that manages the namespace it can contain all the metadata for that namespace.  
 Hadoop MapReduce is a software framework that allows for writing applications which 
need to parallel process large amounts of data in large clusters. The amount of data can be multi-
terabyte data-sets and it can be processed on thousands of nodes. On Hadoop MapReduce the nodes 
responsible for computing a set of data are typically the same node where the data is located 
making the execution much simpler and faster(Ghemawat, 2008). A MapReduce job usually splits 
the input data-set into independent chunks which are processed by the map tasks in a completely 
parallel manner. The framework sorts the outputs of the maps, which are then input to the reduce 
tasks. Typically both the input and the output of the job are stored in a file-system. The framework 
                                                     
19 Apache Hadoop HDFS. [Online], Available at: http://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-
project-dist/hadoop-hdfs/HdfsDesign.html, [Accessed 6 February 2015]. 
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takes care of scheduling tasks, monitoring them and re-executes the failed tasks20. The user making 
MapReduce jobs typically specifies the map and reduce functions and the underlying systems 
parallelizes the process across the nodes in an efficient manner. The framework handles failures 
and re-executes failed tasks and coordinates operations for efficient network communication, disk 
and processing usage.  
 The Hadoop ecosystem of open source projects is built in a way that allows easy porting 
and migrating between different storage solutions and also data processing solutions(Sandhya 
Narayan, 2012). Therefore a project that is being developed over Hadoop has a bigger value/feature 
set, than the value/feature set of that single solution. Many additional options are available because 
of the ecosystem that it is a part of. These therefore add to the value and possible number of 
implementations. Also, as most Apache projects, it has a large development community so updates 
and improvements are frequent. 
Apache	HBase	
 Apache HBase is one of the projects built on top of Hadoop, more specifically the HDFS. 
It falls in the wide-column family of NoSQL database systems and is a distributed database system. 
As stated on the official pages21 it is more a "Data Store" than a "Data Base" because it lacks many 
of the features you find in an RDBMS, such as typed columns, secondary indexes, triggers, and 
advanced query languages, etc. The way it is built allows it to have linear scalability characteristics. 
Also, because it is a part of the Hadoop ecosystem of open source projects, it is very modular as the 
data stored can be used by other data processing systems. It can also be migrated to other solution 
if there is a need for it.  
  
                                                     
20 Apache Hadoop MapReduce. [Online], Available at: 
http://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-mapreduce-client/hadoop-mapreduce-client-
core/MapReduceTutorial.html, [Accessed 7 February 2015]. 
21 Apache Hbase. [Online], Available at: http://hbase.apache.org/book.html, [Accessed 15 February 
2015]. 
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Most notable HBase features, as stated on the official website22, are: 
 Strongly consistent reads/writes: HBase is not an "eventually consistent" DataStore. This 
makes it very suitable for tasks such as high-speed counter aggregation. 
 Automatic sharding: HBase tables are distributed on the cluster via regions, and regions are 
automatically split and re-distributed as your data grows. 
 Automatic RegionServer failover 
 Hadoop/HDFS Integration: HBase supports HDFS out of the box as its distributed file 
system. 
 MapReduce: HBase supports massively parallelized processing via MapReduce for using 
HBase as both source and sink. 
 Java Client API: HBase supports an easy to use Java API for programmatic access. 
 Thrift/REST API: HBase also supports Thrift and REST for non-Java front-ends. 
 Block Cache and Bloom Filters: HBase supports a Block Cache and Bloom Filters for high 
volume query optimization. 
 Operational Management: HBase provides build-in web-pages for operational insight as 
well as JMX metrics. 
As HBase is built on top of HDFS it provides additional functionalities. As HDFS is a general 
purpose file distribution system, it has its limitations regarding usability ("from a developers 
perspective"). HBase stores data inside a tables and rows. This is familiar to anyone who worked 
with standard RDBMSs although this is almost the only similarity.  
Apache	Hive	
 Hive is also one of the open source projects developed on top of Hadoop. It is  mainly a 
distributed data warehouse system. The list of organisations using Hive as stated on the official 
website23 include: eBay, Facebook, LinkedIn, Spotify, Taobao, Tencent, and Yahoo!. As an open 
source project, Hive has a strong technical development community working with a widely located 
and diverse users and organizations. Hive was originally designed as a translation layer on top of 
Hadoop MapReduce. As a query language it has its own variant called HiveQL (Hive query 
language) that will be familiar to anyone already familiar with SQL. It also allows for easy use of 
                                                     
22 Apache Hbase. [Online], Available at: http://hbase.apache.org/book.html, [Accessed 15 February 
2015]. 
23 Apache Hive. [Online], Available at: https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/Hive/Home, 
[Accessed 7 February 2015]. 
University of Aveiro, Department of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics 35 
 
P a g e  | 35 
the MapReduce framework for more complex analysis and it can be extended with custom scalar, 
aggregation and table functions (UDFs, UDAFs and UDTFs). It does not offer real time queries or 
row-level updates, and as such, is best suited for batch style jobs (over large sets of data). As stated 
on the official website the main advantages of Hive are24: 
 scalability (scale out with more machines added dynamically to the Hadoop cluster); 
 extensibility (with MapReduce framework and UDF/UDAF/UDTF);  
 fault-tolerance; 
 loose-coupling with its input formats.  
Apache	Spark	
 Spark is also an Apache open source project since 2010. It is a fast processing engine that 
has some advances over the standard Hadoop MapReduce jobs. It utilizes in-memory processing 
and data caching for faster performance compared to MapReduce. The official site states25 that it is 
100x faster in memory and 10x faster on disk than MapReduce. It is designed to access data from 
other Apache Hadoop projects like HDFS, Cassandra and HBase and to perform both batch 
processing (similar to MapReduce) and new workloads like streaming, interactive queries, and 
machine learning. As an example of the large development community and overall development 
efforts regarding this project, from the period of January 5th 2014. to January 5th 2015., it had 6906 
commits and 419 contributors26 making it the most (or one of the most) active among Apache and 
Big Data open source projects in general. It supports a variety of popular development languages 
including Java, Python and Scala. This project therefore is already a great solution for many large 
data processing applications and has great promise for future developments. 
Apache	Cassandra	
 Apache Cassandra is again an Apache open source project in the Hadoop "ecosystem" of 
projects. It is mainly a data warehouse and it falls in the row-oriented wide-column family of 
NoSQL database systems. Same as other projects it has support from other systems in the Hadoop 
"ecosystem" as the data from Cassandra can be used by, for instance Spark, and processed. Porting, 
migrating from other sources should also be easy. It is suited for storing large amounts of data as it 
also has linear characteristics regarding scalability. Main benefit of using Cassandra is a SQL like 
query language called CQL ("Cassandra Query Language") and functionalities like column indexes 
                                                     
24 Apache Hive. [Online], Available at: https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/Hive/Home, 
[Accessed 7 February 2015]. 
25 Apache Spark. [Online], Available at: http://spark.apache.org/, [Accessed 7 February 2015]. 
26 Apache Spark summary. [Online], Available at: https://www.openhub.net/p/apache-spark, 
[Accessed 16 February 2015.]. 
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allowing more efficient storage and data manipulations depending on the structure defined by the 
user. Cassandra is very suitable for environments such as storing sensor data as it is scalable and 
has proven fault-tolerance on commodity hardware or cloud infrastructure27. The distribution of 
data across nodes is primarily organized according to the value of the primary key. Data which has 
the same value of the primary key will be located on the same node allowing fast reads. This also 
means that related data can easily be controlled and stored in one node, therefore allowing for fast 
access for data processing if needed.  
MongoDB	
 MongoDB is one of the most popular choices in the document based NoSQL family of 
database systems. It stores data in a JSON like format called BSON in documents and because of 
this is very well suited for object mapping and storing unstructured data. BSON types are a 
superset of JSON types as it contains some types like date or a byte array types and the format is 
optimized for storage and scan speeds. Storing data in MongoDB consists of defining objects with 
attributes that contain data and unlike other NoSQL systems like most wide-column solutions, it 
does not suffer the problem of knowing the structure beforehand. The structure can be changed at 
any point and as long as the implementation (the application using MongoDB) can cope with this, 
problems should not occur. Another good point of MongoDB is that it is well suited for use on a 
large variety of machines, not necessary on high performance ones. A disadvantage on using 
MongoDB is that it is somewhat slow regarding reading and modifying the data compared to, for 
instance, wide-column solutions. Its main purpose or use-case is to be used in implementations 
where the data structure/schema is frequently changing and/or unknown at the beginning(Min 
Chen, 2014)(Roshni Bajpayee, 2015).  
Some of the most significant features/characteristics of MongoDB28:  
 Indexing - primary and secondary indexes are available. The benefits of indexing are the 
same as those found in traditional RDBMSs; 
 Advanced queries - MongoDB supports range search, field search, regular expressions and 
other functionalities commonly lacking in other scalable NoSQL systems; 
 Replication - making replicas increases the availability of data. replicas can either have a 
primary or a secondary role similar to a master-slave methodology; 
                                                     
27 Apache Cassandra. [Online], Available at: http://cassandra.apache.org/, [Accessed 16 February 
2015]. 
28 MongoDB HomePage. [Online], Available at: http://www.mongodb.org/, [Accessed 7 February 
2015]. 
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 Load balancing and fault tolerant - using sharding based on user defined shard keys, data 
collections are split into ranges and distributed. The user chooses a shard key, which 
determines how the data in a collection will be distributed. This can be run over multiple 
machines and the shards are also replicated and therefore providing fault tolerance; 
 File storage - as MongoDB is a document-based NoSQL distributed database system it can 
also be used as a distributed file storage system. This functionality is called GridFS and it 
is included in MongoDB;  
 Aggregation - MapReduce jobs can be used for aggregation purposes. For instance 
achieving the usual GROUP BY functionality from SQL in RDBMSs;  
Neo4j	
 Noe4j is currently one of most popular from the graph-based NoSQL family of database 
systems. It mostly adequate for applications where relations between entities are the focus of 
implementation. It is used by a lot of companies29, it is supported on many platforms and 
frameworks so easy integration of Neo4j in almost any application in need of a graph database 
should be easy. This is maybe the biggest benefit of Neo4j over other possible products along with 
the large set of functionalities and ecosystem of tools and libraries.  
Neo4j most significant features30: 
 It has a SQL like query language called CQL ("Cypher Query Language") making it 
familiar to users already familiar with SQL; 
 It follows Property Graph Data Model 
 Advanced features like: Indexing, UNIQUE constraints, transactions, ACID compliant  
 It uses Native graph on disk storage with Native GPE(Graph Processing Engine) 
 It supports exporting of query data to JSON and XML format 
 Support for many platforms, languages, simple to use APIs... 
 High-speed traversals in the node space 
The disadvantages of Neo4j are mostly regarding selling strategies, expenses, the lack of features in 
the free "Community" version and issues with dual licenses. Regarding technical disadvantages 
                                                     
29 Neo4j official. [Online], Available at: http://neo4j.com/, [Accessed 18 February 2015]. 
30 Tutorialspoint Neo4j. [Online], Available at: 
http://www.tutorialspoint.com/neo4j/neo4j_features_advantages.htm, [Accessed 18 February 
2015]. 
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there are not many. Although sources31 indicate that Neo4j does not scale on write operations 
because its replication works on a Master/Slave principle, the official site states32 that, from version 
2.2, it has Massive write scalability, supporting a new bulk import utility at a rate of 1M 
records/second. Capacity is stated to support graphs with tens of billions of nodes and relationships. 
OrientDB	
 OrientDB is a newer NoSQL system (since 2012). This data management system is a 
mixture of document-based and graph-based NoSQL families. It stores data similar to document-
based systems like MongoDB and combines it with the relations found in graph databases like 
Neo4j. On the official site of OrientDB33 they have direct comparisons to MongoDB and Neo4j and 
state clear advantages in comparison to both alternatives. it combines advantages from both graph 
and document based solutions solving most of the problems by adding relations and fast traversal 
over relations to classic document-based solution and flexibility, scalability and sharding to a 
graph-based solutions. Therefore this solution has much promises and can be applied to a wide 
variety of implementation problems and seems like a perfect blend between MongoDB and Neo4j 
and a good alternative to both of those and traditional RDBMSs.   
Most significant features include34: 
 Combines the features from document and graph based systems 
 OrientDB SQL - supports SQL with some extensions for handling trees and graphs 
 Multi-Master Replication - sharding, fault tolerance, availability, scalability...  
 ACID Compliance - fully ACID transactions across distributed data storage system 
 Community Edition is free - free even for commercial use and contains all of the most 
significant features as the Enterprise edition accept customer support, backups,  profiling 
and similar features  
Redis	
 Redis is a key-value based NoSQL data store. Unlike other solutions it stores data directly 
in memory and uses the disk's storage only for persistence, so reading and writing is extremely fast 
but storage space is limited to memory. It has master-slave replication and can support any number 
                                                     
31 OrientDB official site. [Online], Available at: http://www.orientechnologies.com/orientdb/, 
[Accessed 18 February 2015]. 
32 Neo4j official. [Online], Available at: http://neo4j.com/, [Accessed 18 February 2015]. 
33 OrientDB official site. [Online], Available at: http://www.orientechnologies.com/orientdb/, 
[Accessed 18 February 2015]. 
34 OrientDB official site. [Online], Available at: http://www.orientechnologies.com/orientdb/, 
[Accessed 18 February 2015]. 
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of slaves35. One of the more significant advantages over other systems is the supported rich set of 
data types including: strings, lists, sets, hash tables, sorted sets and others.  
Other features that are stated on the official website include36: 
 Transactions 
 Pub/Sub 
 Lua scripting 
 Keys with a limited time-to-live 
 LRU (least recently used) eviction of keys 
 Automatic failover 
Redis is a simple to integrate solution not only for specific implementation situations and use-cases 
but can be viewed as a way to speed up fetching and modifying small frequently used parts of data. 
Problems regarding the storage and usage of data can usually be separated into 2 categories. In one 
category there would be a large quantity of data that is rarely queried or data that needs to be 
processed and the other, small quantity of data that needs to be queried almost always before other 
queries are to be executed like for instance authentication information. 
2.5.3 Security	issues	in	NoSQL	
 NoSQL databases solve many functional problems that conventional RDBMSs have 
providing greater scalability, flexibility allowing applications to better scale-out and/or utilize 
different kinds of data. The distribution of data is commonly done by utilizing sharding 
mechanisms and the usual RDBMS ACID properties are exchanged for BASE properties. this, of 
course does not apply to graph-based NoSQL database systems because they support transactions 
with full ACID properties. While this provides good and usable features and characteristics mainly 
utilized for scalability, it brings to the surface a lot of security issues that need to be dealt with.  
 The authors of (Anam Zahid, 2014)(Priya P. Sharma, 2014) (Lior Okman, 2011) analyzed 
a few of the most popular NoSQL choices and made security analysis' of them. They evaluated 
security features that they use and mention features that are still lacking. Areas that were looked at 
can be divided into: authentication, access control, data encryption, secure configurations and 
auditing. The database systems that were analyzed include: MongoDB, CouchDB, Redis, Hadoop, 
HBase, Cassandra, Redis and Couchbase Server. Although every single one implements some 
features, all of them lack a complete set of security features. MongoDB seems to have the strongest 
                                                     
35 Redis website FAQ. [Online], Available at: http://redis.io/topics/faq, [Accessed 20 February 
2015]. 
36 Redis official website. [Online], Available at: http://redis.io/, [Accessed 20 February 2015]. 
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security feature list and Redis has almost no security features. It is easy to see that the main focus 
of these solutions is performance, leaving security issues to be solved on the application and 
maintained and configured by system administrators. Table 6 shows the result of research done by 
(Anam Zahid, 2014).  
 
Table 6. Comparative analysis of sharding security in various NoSQL databases(Anam Zahid, 2014) 
2.5.4 Performance	studies	and	comparisons	
 Comparisons and performance evaluations given by the authors of (A B M Moniruzzaman, 
2013)(Bogdan George Tudorica, 2011)(Rajendra Kumar Shukla, 2015)(Enrico Barbierato, 2014) 
(Corporation, 2013) give a good picture of the current state and capabilities of the most used 
NoSQL database systems. It has to be noted that the NoSQL databases taken into account were 
mainly either document or wide column based and these are the best suited for storing and handling 
large amounts of data. The performance test included measuring latency in scenarios with different 
ratios of read/write/update operations. Compared to RDBMSs the results indicate that NoSQL 
systems have greater capacity and can cope with more operations which is to be expected. After a 
certain number of operations, latency in RDBMS increased significantly (exponentially) while in 
NoSQL systems suffered little. Results indicate similar performance inside the different NoSQL 
paradigm families. MongoDB (document-based) was shown to be somewhat slower than Cassandra 
or HBase (wide-column based) with bigger workloads which is to be expected because of the 
differences between their storage systems and functionalities they offer.  
 The performance evaluation given by (Corporation, 2013) can be seen in Figure 8, Figure 
9, Figure 10, and Figure 11. This, along with the information found in other sources mentioned 
before in this subsection, was the basis behind choosing the databases for this solution. That 
decision is shown in subsection 4.1.1.  
The following workloads were included in the benchmark (Corporation, 2013): 
1. Read-mostly workload: 95% read to 5% update ratio; 
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2. Read/write combination: 50% read to 50% update ratio; 
3. Write-mostly workload: 99% update to 1% read; 
4. Read/scan combination: 47% read, 47% scan, 6% update; 
5. Read/write combination with scans: 25% read, 25% scan, 25% update, 25% insert; 
6. Read latest workload: 95% read to 5% insert; 
7. Read-modify-write: 50% read to 50% read-modify-write. 
 
 
Figure 8. Read latency across all workloads(Corporation, 2013) 
 Figure 8 shows the read latency over a variety of workloads. It Shows that all three 
perform well and the latency does not increase significantly (linearly or exponentially) with 
partitioning but remain stable. Compared to HBase and MongoDB, Cassandra has less latency and 
seems to be most stable. 
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Figure 9. Insert latency across all workloads(Corporation, 2013) 
 Figure 9 shows the insert (e.g. write) characteristics across a number of shards and a 
variety of workloads. MongoDB has a noticeable increase of latency while HBase and Cassandra 
have very stable write times. Cassandra again performs slightly better that HBase.  
 
Figure 10. Update latency across all workloads(Corporation, 2013) 
 Figure 10 shows the update characteristics. MongoDB has a noticeable increase of latency 
while HBase and Cassandra have very stable latency times. Cassandra again performs slightly 
better that HBase. These results are very similar to the ones from Figure 9 which is to be expected 
as write and update operations are closely related in the sense that data has to be overwritten with 
new data.  
 
Figure 11. Scan latency across all workloads(Corporation, 2013) 
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 Figure 11 shows the scan characteristics of the databases. MongoDB has a noticeable 
increase decrease while HBase and Cassandra have very stable latency times. Cassandra again 
performs slightly better that HBase and both perform better than MongoDB.  
2.5.5 NoSQL	systems	‐	summary	
 NoSQL systems provide solutions in the areas of IoT and Big Data. Same as in other areas, 
the interest of large Internet companies such as Google, Amazon and Facebook pushed 
developments, and because of this there a lot of good solutions available. NoSQL solves problems 
that conventional RDBMS cannot cope with or are not flexible enough or adapted for. Evaluations 
regarding data storage, handling and additional features of these solutions suggest that security is 
still an issue and may be the next significant improvement. Along with this new combined 
solutions similar to the document-graph mixed solution OrientDB utilizes could be the next step in 
NoSQL. Performance evaluations (regarding reads, writes, updates...) indicate that improvements 
are always needed and welcomed but are at a level that is satisfying for most needs. This means 
that the choice of the database system that is going to be used in an application should not be done 
from a performance perspective, but from a more general and data type oriented perspective along 
with evaluating the ecosystem that the main solution is a part of. More significant improvements 
could come in the area of data processing and analysis. The Apache Hadoop ecosystem of open 
source projects is currently the most fertile ground for improvements in this area.  
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3 Background 
 This section presents the context in which this work is being done, related work and other 
achievements that are closely related to this work. In subsection 3.1 Smart Cities will be presented 
as a concept and some examples will be given along with presenting SMARTIE which most 
relevant to this work. Subsection 3.2 will present related work in the area of XACML evaluation 
engines and XACML related projects.  
3.1 Smart	Cities	
 As mentioned in (Pardo, 2011), the term smart city is widely used, often outside of the 
computer science context but rather in a more social and cultural context. Definitions therefore 
vary and many exist, but the final aim is to make a better use of the public resources, increasing the 
quality of the services offered to the citizens, while reducing the operational costs of the public 
administrations (Taylor Sheltona, 2015). The context that is regarded to in this work is as an IoT 
application scenario. We will define it as:  
"A city utilizing an infrastructure of sensor networks and services to collect and utilize the 
generated data for the main purpose of improving efficiency and managing of the city, e.g.: traffic, 
energy and utilities, healthcare, public safety, education etc.". 
 IoT, Big Data and security are therefore areas essential to smart cities. They are one of the 
applications that offer great promise in the improvement of everyday life and because of the 
infrastructure, could also help in scientific research.  
 
Figure 12. Fundamental components of a Smart City(Pardo, 2011) 
46 Background 
 
46 | P a g e   
 In Figure 12 the fundamental components of a Smart City as defined by (Pardo, 2011) can 
be seen. This is a general and "outside" view rather than a technological one. It describes the 
factors that are needed for a Smart City to exist. These are three factors: Technology, Human and 
Institution. The Technology factor represents all of the technologies needed for a city to become 
"smart". On a minimum, they would need to include a physical infrastructure (sensor networks, 
servers for data storage and processing) and a software component for utilizing it(Milind Naphade, 
2011). As the smart city is cantered mainly around benefits for the city's citizens, the human 
element is essential. The degree of acceptance has to be high for the concept to work, and therefore, 
the functionality has to compliment the needs of the citizens. It also needs to ensure safety of 
personal and confidential information. The institutional component incorporates the regulations and 
planning that has to take place. The government and regulatory bodies need to be fully included to 
utilize this technology as efficiently as possible. This kind of large scale projects need plans for 
growth, regulations and managing solutions which all need to be governed by the city's authorities. 
Bureaucracy issues could delay projects like these for a significant period, therefore these issues 
need to be dealt with in a timely and efficient manner.  
 Smart cities are very promising projects as they offer improvements to everyday lives for 
their citizens, more efficient management of resources, infrastructure for scientific research and 
others, all with a lower maintenance overhead than before. As they are large scale applications, 
they have many issues and challenges to overcome. After they become a reality and are proved to 
work, adaptation to other areas will come easy, so cities and their citizens are not the only ones that 
could benefit (Pardo, 2011). Some of the most beneficial aspects would be: smart traffic control, 
smart energy consumption and monitoring, environment monitoring, healthcare monitoring, etc.  
3.1.1 SMARTIE	
 SMARTIE (Smart City) is a European project with the goal of solving security, privacy 
and trust issues in IoT, in a Smart City implementation. Partners include companies, universities 
and cities from Germany, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and the UK. As stated on the official website37 
the project officially started on September 1st 2013., and is scheduled to end on August 31st 2016. 
It has a total budged of 4,862,363 € with the contribution from EU in the amount of 3,286,144 €.   
Vision		
 SMARTIE is aimed at creating a distributed framework to share large volumes of 
heterogeneous information to be used in smart-city applications, enabling end-to-end security and 
                                                     
37 SMARTIE Homepage. [Online], Available at: http://www.smartie-project.eu/project.html, 
[Accessed 20 February 2015.]. 
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trust in information delivery for decision-making purposes following data owner’s privacy 
requirement. Benefits of having a secure, trusted and easy to use IoT system for Smart Cities will 
prove beneficial to citizens, enterprises and the City's Administration. Maintinance of cities 
services will be reduced and it will be easier for the City's Administration to gather accurate 
information about the City's services, systems and citizens while still protecting private and 
confidential information. In SMARTIE, privacy and trust are considered a key prerequisite for 
citizens to participate in Smart City activities and services. SMARTIE aims at developing a 
framework for Smart Cities, with the potential to improve life of their citizens enormously. 
Enterprises can benefit from the securely provided information. They can optimize their business 
processes and deal with peak demands introduced by the dynamics of the Smart City. Furthermore, 
they can offer more tailored solutions for their customers based on the status of the Smart City.  
Main	goals	
The goals that are stated on the official website38 are: 
 Understanding requirements for data and application security and creating a policy-enabled 
framework supporting data sharing across applications; 
 Developing new technologies that establish trust and security in the perception layer and 
network layer; 
 Develop new technologies for trusted information creation and secure storage for the 
information service layer; 
 Develop new technologies for information retrieval and processing guided by access 
control policies in the application layer; 
 Demonstrate the project results in real use cases. 
Key	Challenges		
The idea of the IoT brings new challenges regarding security and in consequence also for privacy, 
trust and reliability. The major issues are: 
 Many devices are no longer protected by well-known mechanisms such as firewalls and 
can be attacked via the wireless channel directly. In addition devices can be stolen and 
analysed by attackers to reveal their key material. 
                                                     
38 SMARTIE Homepage. [Online], Available at: http://www.smartie-project.eu/project.html, 
[Accessed 20 February 2015.]. 
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 Combining data from different sources is the other major issue since there is no trust 
relationship between data providers and data consumers at least not from the very 
beginning. 
 Secure exchange of data is required between IoT devices and consumers of their 
information 
Expected	Impact	
 The expected impact of this project, as are stated on the official website, is summarized in 
the following list: 
 The SMARTIE IoT platform will allow the virtualization of the functionalities of 
discovery, secure information access, processing and privacy-aware distribution between 
the consumer and producer of the data generated by the smart objects. 
 It will demonstrate the applicability in scenarios linked to the green behaviour and 
sustainability of smart cities like efficient transport/mobility and energy management. 
 SMARTIE will facilitate new companies for developing and providing services over its 
IoT infrastructure/platform. 
 SMARTIE allows heterogeneous and multiple source of data to interact in reliable and 
secure manner providing third parties developers in Europe to enter the Smart Cities area 
and in that way increase the share of the IoT market. 
Use	Cases	
SMARTIEs current use-cases with their specific aspects, as stated on the official website, are: 
1. Frankfurt/Oder (GER) 
 Traffic management with the possibility to influence real traffic; 
 Focus on authentication, trust, data security and interoperability. 
2. Murcia (ES) 
 Monitoring energy efficiency in the campus; 
 Users can interact with the system to improve energy efficiency. 
3. Belgrade (RS) 
 Provide smart transportation using location of busses and travellers; 
 Focus on data security and privacy using developed access rights and policies. 
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3.1.2 Other	Smart	City	projects	
 There are a number of smart city projects that exist and are currently taking place (Angelo 
Cenedese, 2014)(Andrea Zanella, 2014)(Milind Naphade, 2011). Most are still in somewhat early 
stages and need to be fully built and proven to move from a research projects on universities to 
larger scale projects. Some aspects of Smart Cities are already visible in areas as traffic. 
Monitoring has become common and things like traffic sensors connected to a centralized systems 
have existed for some years. These systems maybe would not fall in the category of "Smart" but 
aim towards the same goals as smart cities. A fully developed smart city solution would improve 
on these significantly and would need less maintenance.  
 Padova is one of the more significant IoT smart city pilot application that were done in 
recent years (Angelo Cenedese, 2014). From the published work a general architecture can be seen 
that contains the sensor database, connections to the sensors for collecting data, an interfaces for 
direct sensor access and a web front-end interface. It was tested using lights sensors placed on a 
road from which the number of passing cars could be gathered and simple traffic monitoring could 
be realised. It is stated that it was built with expansion in mind so the progress from this project 
could prove to be significant in this area.  
 As mentioned, there are a other smart city projects currently being developed but unlike 
SMARTIE most are focused on specific aspects and specific test scenarios and rarely grow bigger 
after they are complete. SMARTIE is a solution for smart cities that unlike other efforts is being 
developed with security concerns and standardisation in mind. The fact that it is founded by the 
European Union gives even more significance to the project because if successful, it will surely be 
utilized in many European cities. This is a crucial part because the involvement of the EU means 
faster solving of any bureaucracy or other non technical issues along with possibly more funding in 
case of the project's success. Along with having the focus on solving this problem for cities today, 
the project also focuses on utilizing standards, stimulating innovation and producing improvements 
and developments in the area of IoT. This is an important fact as practically, it means easier 
adaptation to different cities and their needs.  
3.2 Related	work		
 This section will present some projects, implementations, products that are related and 
relevant to the work done in this dissertation. A brief overview and explanation will be given along 
with a critical opinion for every one of these. These were a result of research done while doing this 
work and is possible that it's is not complete or completely accurate. Other significant solutions 
therefore could exist but did not come up during the research process. 
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Axiomatics		
 Axiomatics is a Stockholm, Sweden based company that is currently leading in the area of 
implementations utilizing ABAC and XACM. They do not offer open source solutions and have a 
somewhat complicated business structure for getting the products. They have a several 
implementations developed for specific solutions for filtering data in some relational databases, 
enforcing access control when to manage access to multiple applications and some others and a 
useful Eclipse IDE plug-in for easier creation of policies. The low point that was established while 
researching this company is that the products are not easy and straightforward to get to. On the 
other hand they often organize educational webinars for showing some uses and benefits of using 
ABAC. Their products unfortunately do not seem to be aimed at large scale IoT implementations as 
they do not mention those possibilities and the products aim at specific problems. On their site it is 
stated that they have a wide customer base, a number of offices across the US and have the goal to 
provide more ABAC solutions. Their products are focused on certain implementations mentioned 
before and unfortunately not a lot of information can be found on their official website39, at least 
not regarding the core engine they are using for access control and technical details about their 
solutions. In any case this company offers great promise as it is focused purely on dynamic access 
control utilizing ABAC and the OASIS XACML standard(OASIS, 2013). 	
Balana	
 Balana is an XACML implementation. It is an engine that supports the latest version of the 
standard and it essentially provides the functionality of the PDP and other core functionalities40. It 
is based on Sun's XACML implementation that will be addressed after Balana. Balana is a good 
engine that can also be expanded and it is used by lot of systems. It solves the most difficult and 
time consuming part of implementing a system utilizing XACML which is the PDP or more 
specifically the evaluation part. It is an open source solution under the standard Apache licence. It 
was considered for using as a starting point instead of the AT&T project but was not because it 
does not support the JSON profile of the standard (OASIS, 2014).   
Sun's	XACML	Implementation	
 From what the research indicates this is one of the earlier implementations of XACML and 
is also an open source solution under a standard Apache licence(Fatih Turkmen, 2008 ). It was 
                                                     
39 Axiomatics ALFA home. [Online], Available at: 
http://www.axiomatics.com/solutions/products/authorization-for-applications/developer-tools-and-
apis/192-axiomatics-language-for-authorization-alfa.html, [Accessed Fevruary 2015]. 
40 WSO2 Balana Implementation GitHub project. [Online], Available at: 
https://github.com/wso2/balana, [Accessed 20 May 2015]. 
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developed in Sun Microsystems Laboratories which is a part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. The official 
website41 does not offer a lot of information but reveals that the last update was in 2006. This could 
mean many things but it is not wrong to conclude that further development will not occur. As 
Balana was based on this implementations and many other systems use Balana, its development 
will continue but probably inside other solutions that use one of these.  
AT&T	XACML	implementation	
 This is an open source project (AT&T, 2014) available on GitHub, which implements 
XACML. From the content of the project it can be concluded that the aim of it is to develop a 
complete XACML implementation, supporting the JSON variant along with the REST profile 
(OASIS, 2014). This solution is not a complete implementation but offers a good base for further 
development and expansion. The documentation for this project is also lacking and is a big issue 
for anyone trying to use it but as it is the only solution that states support for the JSON variant of 
the XACML standard it was chosen as a base project for development. The design choices and 
reasoning is explained in more detail in subsection 4.1. This project has a partial implementation of 
all the features of XACML and has a large base of tests that verify which implemented components 
work correctly. This means that certain, more complicated conditions and combining algorithms 
will not be possible but it provides a good base for expansion.  
 This implementation consists of several projects covering different functionalities:  
 XACML - contains base functionalities, base classes and interfaces. It contains the 
interfaces for PIP, PEP, PDP and PAP engines. Additionally it contains functionality for 
configuration and it is done through an xacml.properties file located in the base folder of 
the project. It is used by all of the other projects that have more specific functionalities 
implemented; 
 XACML-PDP - contains all the functionality needed for the PDP to evaluate request. This 
includes calling PIPs and asking for requests. Not all logical and comparison operations are 
implemented (example: "<, >, <=,>=" comparisons between date/time type data types);  
 XACML-PAP-ADMIN - contains functionality for the PAP; 
 XACML-REST - contains common functionality used by the PAP-REST and PDP-REST 
projects. The functionality is regarding the REST service;  
 XACML-PDP-REST - provides a REST service interface for the PDP;  
 XACML-PAP-REST - provides a REST service interface for the PAP;  
                                                     
41 2006. Sun's XACML Implementation. [Online], Available at: http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/ 
[Accessed 20 May 2015]. 
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 XACML-TEST - contains a library of tests which verify the functionality of some 
components. The tests are mainly regarding the PDP and base XACML project and do not 
test the PAP or REST services. 
 As this project is a work in progress it does not include extensive documentation nor a 
straightforward method of running or using the functionalities that it provides. Many parts therefore 
are not finished and do not work. After considerable effort was taken to run and test all of the parts 
of this projects it was concluded that the XACML-PAP-ADMIN, XACML-REST, XACML-PDP-
RES and the XACML-PAP-REST components either do not work or require significant effort and 
extensive knowledge of the project to utilize. The XACML and XACML-PDP, and the 
functionality they provide on the other hand were tested and proven to work. The XACML-PDP 
supports most, but not all of the evaluation functions defined in the XACML standard(OASIS, 
2013). An example would be "<, >, <=,>=" comparisons between date/time type data types. 
Although these are not currently supported, implementing these additional components should not 
take much effort because the project is well structured and classes with implementations of other 
working functions can be viewed as references or starting points.  
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4 Solution description  
 This section will describe in detail the work that has been done along with a short 
description of the development process.  
 In subsection 4.1 the solutions architecture and workflow is explained along with design 
choices and technologies used, subsection 4.2 gives a description of every major component, 
subsection 4.3 presents the proposed implementation scenarios, subsection 4.4 will give a brief 
overview of development process and subsection 4.5 will present a critical overview and potential 
improvements.  
4.1 Design	choices	and	general	architecture	
 After extensive research and regarding the technologies currently available shown in 
sections 2 and 3, a number of design choices were made and an architecture was made. This 
subsection will describe the reasoning behind the decisions that were made. 
 The developed solution was made to be a general solution, in a sense that is can be used in 
scenarios other than IoT use-cases but, as the main focus is on IoT scenarios, and more precisely 
SMARTIE, the basic limitations and requirements reflect that. The limitations that were taken into 
account come directly from the current state of the SMARTIE project (March 2015.) which means 
that all or most of the use-case scenarios will be fulfilled with the overall solution being simplified, 
making the delivery more realistic (taking in account the time constraints/deadlines for this work). 
This is valid because it will still provide a proof of concept and in that case the limited functionality 
means limited evaluation possibilities like range searches. All of the major components are still 
present including all the communication and major functionality. Of course, the solution allows for 
easy upgrading and expanding of functionality therefore making it possible to have a full 
implementation of the XACML standard.  
4.1.1 Design	choices	and	technologies	used	
 This subsection will name the technologies used and present the reasoning behind choosing 
them.  
Databases	
 The NoSQL databases that were selected are: Cassandra for storing sensor data and Redis 
for storing policies. The reason for choosing NoSQL instead of RDBMS alternatives is because 
NoSQL was determined as a better suited solution for storing sensor data and policies. For storing 
vast amounts of sensor data, scalability is needed and compared to RDBMSs, there are NoSQL 
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systems that are scale much better. In subsection 2.5.4, it is shown that there are NoSQL database 
management systems that can scale linearly.  
 The requirements for the database used for storing sensor data are: capacity to store vast 
amounts of data, scalability, distribution, fast read times, possibility of utilizing data processing 
functionality. For the database used for storing policies, the requirements include: fast read times, 
scalability and distribution, possibility of storing policies (either document or text format). On the 
other hand, it does not have to have a large capacity because the number of policies is not huge and 
therefore does not require a large capacity.  
 Cassandra was chosen because of its good balance between scalability (A B M 
Moniruzzaman, 2013)(Enrico Barbierato, 2014)(Corporation, 2013) and response time 
characteristics and Redis for its speed of fetching data42. These choices were made after significant 
research was done on the performance characteristics of these databases compared to other options, 
which can be seen in Section 2.5. Cassandra proved to be the most appropriate solution for storing 
data and Redis for the storing of policies. Cassandra also offers compatibility with other Hadoop 
systems because it is also a part of the Hadoop eco-system. This could prove to be very beneficial 
because of the data processing options and possible migration to other systems, if the need for that 
ever comes up.  
 The Cassandra NoSQL database used in the solution is used just for testing as it is an 
appropriate storage solution for sensor data but does not necessarily have to be used when using 
this developed solution as described in subsections 4.2.1 and 4.3. Cassandra is also used for storing 
attribute data. This is also done mainly for testing purposes regarding the PIP. 
 Compared to Cassandra, Redis is a smaller and simpler solution which stores data in 
memory, as a result of which the response is so fast. The drawback is the limited space for storage 
which is not of a great concern because the space required for storing policies is not large.   
 Data Manager modules are placed in front of both databases to control the communication 
and management of the databases. These managers therefore are the only entities that control and 
survey all the interaction with the databases, they limit the type of actions that can be executed and 
therefore prevent unwanted actions like deleting and/or emptying tables.  
XACML	base	project	
 The access control framework utilizes some functionality provided by the AT&T project 
(AT&T, 2014) and uses some of its functionalities to make the developed solution work. A 
                                                     
42 Redis official website. [Online], Available at: http://redis.io/, [Accessed 20 February 2015]. 
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description of the AT&T project by components is given in subsection 3.2. The project was used 
mainly for its PDP engine, interfaces for the PIPs and configuration functionality. The PDP engine 
has the evaluation functionality built in along with asking PIPs for attributes while evaluating. The 
implementation required implementing that basic engine by extending the base class, initializing 
the PDP and making all the necessary configurations. Functionality of processing the policies and 
returning the result was built separately from the base project. The PIPs were built by 
implementing basic interfaces. Fetching of attributes and returning them to the PDP was added, the 
communication regarding which attributes are needed and which can be provided was also built. 
The configurations functionality was used to control the list of PIPs used, classes for the major 
components and other configurations.   
4.1.2 Solution	architecture	
 The architecture used is based on the one described in the standard's specification (OASIS, 
2013) and instead of having all of the functionality specified in the standard, a subset of simpler 
functionalities was implemented. Although the architecture is based on the architecture defined in 
the standard it was modified. The reasoning behind modifying the architecture will be explained in 
this subsection.  
 While developing a security component based on the OASIS XACML standard a number 
of issues were identified. These issues were related to the architecture proposed in the standard and 
security of connections between components and external services.  
Removal	of	PRP	
Comparing the reference XACML architecture to the one proposed in the OASIS XACML 
standard v3.0 (OASIS, 2013). It can be seen that in addition to new components, the PRP has been 
merged with the PAP. Put differently, the functionality of the PRP has been added to the PAP, 
therefore the PAP is used for retrieving policies.  
An issue with removing the PRP and integrating its functionality in the PAP is that the PDP has 
access to other functionality of the PAP that is outside the scope of what would be in a PRP. This 
means it can potentially add, remove or modify policies. This, of course, is an issue as the PDP 
should not be allowed to do those actions. Separating the PRP from the PAP will remove any 
possibility of the PDP to misuse the PAP. Additionally, as the PAP is and entry point for system 
administrators, separation of the PAP means that that workflow is also completely separated from 
the normal workflow of evaluating policies. This completely removes the system administrator 
from the rest of the system. This was mainly done from an object oriented design perspective, and 
keeping within those principles. The principles in question are SOLID (Single responsibility, Open-
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closed, Liskov substitution, Interface segregation and Dependency inversion) and the one that this 
decision is closest to is the Single responsibility principle and applying it to a component rather 
than just a single class. The PRP then has a single purpose, and even for the engineer that is 
implementing or modifying this software, the chance of misuse is significantly less. As a result, the 
PAP is therefore an entity onto itself and is just an entry point for an administrator to manage 
policies. Also compliant with the Single responsibility principle. 
Differences	 between	 the	 defined	 OASIS	 XACML	 architecture	 and	
the	architecture	of	the	developed	solution	
 Looking at the architecture from an implementation perspective, other issues come up. 
Reviewing the functionality of the PEP, it can be defined as a simple component that needs to act 
accordingly to the response that comes from the PDP. This meant that it needs to fulfil all 
obligations and pass the request in case of a positive or terminate the request in case of a negative 
response.  
 The connection between the Context Handler and the resource is an issue because all 
information that the PDP needs for evaluation has to be formed as attributes. The fetching of 
information therefore should be through the PIP because the PIP is responsible for providing 
additional attributes. Removing that connection, the role of the Context Handler (form an 
implementation perspective) becomes a trivial "middle man" in between the PDP's communication 
with PIP and PEP. The role that the Context Handler still can assume the initialisation/manager 
role, handling all aspects that other components are not responsible for handling. This would 
mainly mean taking care of the initialisation and possibly handling multiple instances.   
 By removing the Context Handler from the PDP-PIP connection but still leaving it in 
between the PEP and PDP allows it to have some management functionality. These would include 
initialisation and configuration, managing multiple instances for a parallel execution scenario and 
leave it open for expansion if needed.   
 Further, it does not contain the Obligation Service component, as can be seen in subsection 
2.1.2. That component was dismissed as it is not essential for the basic functionality and it is not 
required for the targeted IoT implementations. 
Initial	modified	architecture	
 In the next part an initial proposed architecture will be shown and described and after that 
the final architecture will be shown and described as well.  
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Figure 13. Architecture of the initial proposed solution 
 In Figure 13., a more detailed architecture of the initial proposed solution can be seen. This 
architecture is almost the same as the proposed one in the OASIS standard (OASIS, 2013). The 
PEP is the point where the enforcement happens. It forwards the request to the Context Handler 
which handles the basic workflow. It is intended to be simple as possible, and all of the 
configuration, workflow managing and evaluation are done in the Context Handler and PDP. The 
PIP is intended to be flexible in a way that it allows the connection to external services for fetching 
attribute information. This means that the initial request provided to the PEP does not need to 
contain all the information (attribute values) and therefore the access to those services that provide 
attribute data can be limited only to trusted services like this one and not to users/subjects.  
 While developing this solution, a number of problems emerged. The architecture was 
therefore modified. The main issue was the updating of the resource attributes, storing them on a 
separate system, the security issues regarding that connection and the synchronisation of data 
between the systems. Another issue is the connection between the context handler and the PRP. As 
a request is received the Context Handler has to get the policies and deliver them to the PDP. As it 
is just a "middle man" in this case, it is better for it to be connected directly to the PDP. Another 
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issue is connection between the context handler and the PIP. The Context Handler could in this 
case could work in three ways: 
1. Go through a list of policies, see if there are any attributes that are missing and fetch them 
from the PIP and deliver the modified request to the PDP for evaluation; 
2. Fill the request "blindly" with every attribute that it can get with the attributes already 
contained in the request and deliver the modified request to the PDP for evaluation; 
3. Wait for the PDP to ask for the attributes while it is evaluating, fetch the attributes from the 
PIP and deliver them to the PDP. 
 The 1st possibility is somewhat inefficient. The Context Handler has to have functionality 
for searching and parsing policies and requests, and while doing that it will go through all the 
policies and all fill the request with everything that it would need for all of the policies. The request 
could potentially become too large and it would require significant time to parse trough everything 
and fetch, thus degrading performance. Also, this functionality is already built into the PDP as is 
does that while evaluating the requests.  
 The 2nd possibility is requires a simpler functionality as it does not require it to parse 
through all of the requests but it fills every request with all possible attributes all the time. This 
would later be used by the PDP and it will slow down the evaluation process. Additionally, if there 
is a PIP that has to fetch attributes from another outside source through a service and the process of 
fetching the attributes takes significant time, that additional time will be added to the evaluation 
time. This will happen for every request evaluation therefore diminishing performance.  
 The 3rd way is equal to the one defined in the standard. This method is efficient as the PDP 
will ask for attributes only when it needs to and the Context Handler will deliver them to it. The 
problem in this scenario is that the Context Handler is still the "middle man" and just forwards 
requests and responses without having any additional functionality.  
Architecture	of	the	final	solution	
 After some work was done, a final architecture was settled upon with slight modification to 
the one initially proposed, and as a result, has slightly deviated from to the architecture proposed in 
the XACML standard (OASIS, 2013). 
 Another issue that was identified is the division of attributes by type. This is regarding the 
division of attributes in categories as: environment, subject and resource. This is a good way of 
dividing them when viewing the problem from a logical and functional standpoint. Looking it from 
a PIP implementation perspective, the difference between attributes are not in the information they 
represent but the type of source they have to fetch it from. From the perspective of the PIP, it is not 
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important if the PIP is fetching resource, subject or environment data if it is all coming from the 
same source or the way of fetching method is the same. For example: if a person is a registered user 
on a website and wants to change some data on its user profile e.g. telephone number. The resource 
that the user is trying to access and change and the attributes of that resource come from the same 
source as the subject attributes. The methodology of fetching those attributes is also the same. The 
differentiation of these is therefore pointless from an implementation or PIP functionality 
perspective. As another example, the environment attributes can easily come from different sources 
and have much different methodologies for acquiring those attributes. Simple time based 
environmental attributes can be generated by the system and looked up at the time of evaluation. 
They do not need any kind of storage or external connections. On the other hand fetching attributes 
like: legal age limits, tax rates, currency conversion rates etc., is much more different and could 
involve external connections and special procedures.  
 Because of this the differentiation of connections for the PIP by attribute type is pointless 
and a differentiation by source or methodology of acquiring is much more appropriate. The PIP 
therefore can be split into many PIPs depending on the way the attributes are acquired and the 
source. A simple example would be having three PIPs organized as: 
 Generated Attributes PIP - responsible for fetching all attributes that can be generated 
locally without the need to contact any database or external service; 
 Local Attributes PIP - responsible for fetching attributes that are located on local 
databases or can be fetched from other local services; 
 External Attributes PIP - responsible for fetching attributes by contacting external 
services. These would, for example, be REST services.  
 The PIPs also need to know which attributes they can acquire and which attributes, if any, 
are needed to fetch those attributes. The PIPs can be organized in a group and the PDP can than go 
through the group asking which attributes they can provide and which are needed. When it finds a 
match, it requests the attributes and the evaluation continues. Along with dividing the functionality 
of the PIP by functionality as opposed to type of attributes, this means that the PIPs are modular as 
one or several can easily be removed or added to the list.  
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Figure 14. Architecture of the final solution 
 After identifying issues with the OASIS XACML architecture and making the initial 
changes that can be seen in Figure 13, a final architecture was made. Tests of a security component 
implementing were done and are presented in subsection 5.1. The final architecture can be seen in 
Figure 14. The changes do not change the "outside" view of the system but are more of an internal 
change and more refined solution. The connections to the PIP and PRP are moved from the Context 
Handler to the PDP so it can fetch policies and all of the attribute information as it needs, while 
evaluating policies. The PIP is not a single entity but rather a list of PIPs that all have the same 
interface, and all fulfil the same purpose of fetching attributes. Because some attributes are located 
on different locations and need to be fetched using different services they need to implement 
different means of fetching that information. This allows for easy expansion of the PIP 
functionality and better configuration options. This architecture therefore deals with the issues 
University of Aveiro, Department of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics 61 
 
P a g e  | 61 
identified in the initial one. The Context Handler maintains only an initialisation and configuration 
role rather that handling the workflow and being the "middle man". This was established as being 
more efficient and was adopted because of that. The PDP now fetches the policies and additional 
attributes directly from the PRP and list of PIPs, only when it needs to.  
4.2 Description	of	components	
 In this section a functional description of the developed solutions will be described along 
with some implementation details and database schemas that were used. The components that will 
be described can be seen in Figure 14. that shows the architecture of the final solution.  
4.2.1 Packages	and	dependencies	
 This section will describe the dependencies between the several parts of the developed 
solution.  
 
Figure 15. Package dependencies diagram 
 In Figure 15. the dependencies between the several parts can be seen. The different colours 
used in the diagram represent the different levels of "importance" as not all parts are always 
required: 
 Green - components are a critical part of the system and need to be included for the system 
to work even in a basic scenarios; 
 Blue - components are needed when using the solution as a REST service; 
 Grey - components may or may not be needed dependant on the needs of the target 
system. This mainly revolves around the type of resources used and attributes needed. 
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One component that is missing is a basic "Helper" component because it is used, in one way or 
another, by all of the other ones. 
The component listed are:  
1. Helper - this component contains generic classes used by all other components. It contains: 
generic singleton and factory classes, functionality used for logging, basic and generic 
REST client implementation, abstract database manager class and factory, list of constants 
used, class containing useful list of functions like hashing, parsing and others;  
2. AT&T - this is an open source project that was used for its functionality which can be 
described in detail in subsection 3.2. The main functionality used was the PDP engine, PIP 
interfaces so it can be used by the PDP engine and the configuration functionality. Details 
can be seen in subsection 4.1.1;  
3. AccessControl - this contains the main functionality of this solution. It contains the PDP, 
PEPs, PIPs, PRP, PAP, Context Handler and others.  
4. PolicyDB, SensorDB and AttributeDB - these contain the database managers and the java 
clients for the database they are using. The PolicyDB is in green as it is essential for the 
final solution, as policies need to be stored somewhere. The other two are not necessarily 
needed but are likely and meant to be utilized also. All three contain similar functionalities 
and in general are very similar; 
5. REST Service - this component utilizes the Access Control to evaluate requests it receives. 
It is a simple REST service implementation. It is marked in blue because its use depends 
on what type of integration is being utilized as described in subsection 4.3; 
6. PAP Web App - this component serves the purpose of providing the administrator with an 
interface over which he/she can manage the policies used. It contains a web app with all of 
the standard classes and other files found.  
This package layout was made so that the functionalities can be utilized by other systems and were 
separated into different projects simulating how they would be separated onto different machines. 
4.2.2 Components	
PEP	(Policy	Enforcement	Point)	
 The PEP is the point where (as the name states) access control is enforced. This means that 
this point needs to be located in the system that wants to enforce access control at the exact place 
inside the workflow where access control is needed. It therefore needs to be robust enough to 
ensure correct execution and flexible to be implemented on various types of systems. Because of 
this and reasons explained in Section 4.3 the PEP can be used in multiple ways. It can be 
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implemented by providing it with only a XACML request and depending on the response given act 
appropriately. This way the system that is implementing the PEP decides what the resulting action 
will be after the evaluation is finished. The other way is to along with the request, provide the PEP 
with an object that implements a defined interface IResourceFetcher.   
 
Figure 16. Class diagram of the PEPs 
 In Figure 16. the class diagram for the PEPs can be seen. The IResourceFetcher is used 
to ensure that the object provided has methods available for both the positive and negative results 
of the requests evaluation. With this, the PEP executes the execute() in case the evaluation result 
is positive and executes terminate()  in case of a negative result. The purpose of this is to 
remove the decision making part from the system that implements the PEP and have it already built 
in and working. In the case of specific scenarios, the other method of simply getting the evaluation 
result is also available. The RESTPEP and LocalPEP should never both be available for use by 
another system and the intent is to have only one PEP available for implementation/integration but 
they do not collide in functionality. This is explained more in Section 4.3. 
Databases	
 Cassandra and Redis were chosen for the databases. Cassandra was chosen because it is 
well suited for storing sensor data and Redis because of its simple implementation and fast 
response. These choices were explained in more detail in subsection 4.1.  
 In the Cassandra database a single table was used for storing sensor data. It has a simple 
schema with basic fields for storing simple sensor data. The use of this database is strictly for initial 
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testing purposes and that is the reason behind the simple schema. Other scenarios involve using 
other databases or resources. 
 
Figure 17. Cassandra database schema for storing sensor data  
 Figure 17. shows the schema made to store sensor data. The value of the readings is stored 
in the value column. The location is integrated as a frozen which means as a separate, custom 
structure that contains both coordinates and address values. Any of these values can be empty 
making it flexible. As the focus of this work is not on analysing data, the values used are not of real 
concern making this schema is good for storing generic sensor data for testing purposes. The 
INDEX is made of the type column because comparison tests regarding attribute values were 
mainly made on this value.  
 
Figure 18. Redis schema for storing policies 
 Figure 18. shows the structure used for storing policies on the Redis database. The 
structure is a simple hash map with a policyID as a key and the actual policy in string format 
stored as the value. The policyID is a SHA-1 hash value of the actual policy. This almost 
removes the possibility of collisions happening, unless the policies are exactly the same. It also 
adds the ability to get the value of the key from the policy itself. As Redis stores data in memory 
the response is fast. As the number of policies should not be large, the limitation of storing data in 
memory should not be a problem. In the case of memory problems, Redis provides some options 
with storing both on disk and in memory or the solution could be migrated to another NoSQL 
database like CouchDB which has slower response but also less memory limitations.  
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Figure 19. Cassandra database schema for storing attribute data 
 Cassandra is also used for storing attribute data as seen in Figure 19. The tables are 
constructed to mirror the fields needed when fetching attribute data while evaluating requests 
against policies. The fields are therefore named the same as the ones from XACML policies: 
Category, AttributeId and DataType. All columns are of the type string because it is the 
simplest, and most convenient way of storing attribute data and the testing of the PIP's 
functionality. The tables for storing resource and subject attribute data have an additional id 
column because many subjects and resources could have the same type of data but would originate 
from different resources/subjects. The environment is considered as being a single entity and the 
distinction between values is done mainly with the name. These attribute tables could have been 
merged because they differ between each other in the category column, but because of the logical 
difference when considering ABAC and XACML, they were separated.  
Database	Managers	
 Database manager are entities that are placed in front of database clients. Both Cassandra 
and Redis have Java clients that were used for working with the databases. The database managers 
serve the purpose of configuring the database, schemas and limiting the possible actions to 
acceptable ones like adding and retrieving data. The PolicyDBManager and 
AttributeDBManager allow for the deletion and modification of data while the 
SensorDBManager does not support those actions.  
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Figure 20. Class diagram for the Data Managers 
 The class diagram shown in Figure 20. shows that the DBManagerFactory holds 
instances of objects that extend the abstract class DataManager. This has been done to enable the 
use of DataManagers in a singleton fashion without having the same functionality copied to 
everyone. It also allows for some functionality to be added on top of the whole group and the 
execution to be controlled from one place (DBManagerFactory). This structure does not 
guarantee that there will only exist one instance of the objects, since a public constructor has to 
exist but as the intent is to get instances through the Factory, that can be neglected.  
PRP	(Policy	Retrieval	Point)	
 The PRP is a simple entity that is responsible for fetching policies and delivering them to 
the PDP for evaluating requests. The PRP uses the PolicyDBManager for this purpose. It is called 
through a single static function that returns the policies in a list. The PRP was realized in a simple 
manner but it leaves room for extending the functionality. For instance policy filtering according to 
the request's attributes.  
PIPs	(Policy	Information	Points)	
 The PIP is not implemented as a single point but as a list of many PIPs. This is convenient 
because of the many possible ways that the PIP can fetch attributes and different places from which 
the PIP has to fetch attributes. This allows for modular adding and removing of PIPs depending on 
the particular implementation.  
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 There are 3 main PIPs that were made and used in this solution. The 
SmartieLocalEnvironmentPIPEngine used to fetch local environmental attributes. These are basic 
time related attributes (current date, current time...) that were taken from and defined as stated in 
the OASIS XACML standard (OASIS, 2013) These are attributes that can be generated locally 
without the need to connect to a service or fetching from a database. This is the simples PIP to 
implement because it does not require to extract any attributes from the request. The 
SmartieExternalEnvironmentPIPEngine is used for fetching resource attribute from the database 
that contains sensor data and for fetching attributes (external, resource and subject) from a database 
that has attribute data stored. This is used to simulate fetching data from a source other than the one 
containing the resource and although the actual database is the same (Cassandra) the database 
manager is different and the data is stored in different tables under different keyspaces so it is 
effectively a different source. This could have been split into two separate PIPs but as the 
functionality for both are similar, they were combined into one single PIP. Finally the 
RestAtributePIPEngine is used for fetching attribute data from a REST service. This simulates 
fetching data from external sources. Naturally, this list has to be configured/modified or expanded 
for it to be used by other systems as these are built for testing purposes. All of these can be seen in 
a class diagram in Figure 21. The abstract SmartiePIPEngine class is extended from the PIP 
ConfigurableEngine interface provided by AT&T project (AT&T, 2014) and contains functionality 
common to the children classes that extend it.. The implementation of the ConfigurableEngine 
allowed for easier utilisation of the PDP's functionality.  
 These PIPs cover all the scenarios for generating attributes, fetching them from a database 
with direct access and fetching attributes from outside services (via REST service). These therefore 
provide sufficient functionality for testing but can also easily be adopted to work in other scenarios. 
The list can also be expanded and provide connection options over different technologies, to 
different services, etc.  
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Figure 21. Class diagram of the developed PIPs 
University of Aveiro, Department of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics 69 
 
P a g e  | 69 
PDP	(Policy	Decision	Point)	
 The PDP is the most crucial and complicated component needed for a XACML ABAC 
access control implementation. The purpose of the PDP is to evaluate requests using policies and 
returning a response which contains the decision of the evaluation. The rules defined in the 
standard (OASIS, 2013) are extensive and use many operations allowing the policies to be well 
defined and flexible. This, of course, makes the implementation more complex. The evaluation of 
policies was taken from the AT&T (AT&T, 2014) project and an implementation was built to suit 
the purposes of this solution. The building of the PDP required making configuration, connecting 
the PRP to get the policies and building the workflow used for evaluating against a set of policies. 
The basic workflow of the PDP consists of the following: 
1. Receive request; 
2. Fetch policies from PRP; 
3. For every policy ; 
3.1. Begin evaluation; 
3.2. If attribute is missing for evaluation;  
3.2.1. fetch needed attributes from list of PIPs; 
3.3. evaluate request; 
3.4. store result; 
4. If a positive response exists; 
4.1. Return that response and positive result; 
5. If Every result is negative; 
5.1. If there was a valid response (a policy applied for the request); 
5.1.1. Return that response and negative result; 
5.2. Else; 
5.2.1. Return empty response and negative result; 
Figure 22. PDP Workflow 
 As seen in the workflow in Figure 22. the PDP is set to allow the execution of the request if 
there is at least one policy that gives it permission. The workflow was built in this manner as it 
simplifies the process and policies that have to be made for a system.  
 The policies therefore have to be written with this workflow in mind. All policies should 
deny permission by default and allow only if the conditions are met. This was made as it 
accommodates most scenarios and reduces the complexity of using the solution.  
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Request	Parser	
 The Request Parser is an entity that checks the validity of the request sent to the PEP and 
converts the request from the raw string format into a Request object so it can be used by the 
solution. It also recognizes if the request is in JSON or XML format so the system supports the use 
of both.  
PAP	(Policy	Administration	Point)	
 The PAP is and entity that is used to manage the policies used. It has functionality for 
adding, removing and modifying policies. To access the PAP a simple web application is used as 
an interface on which the administrator can manage the policies used. The access to the 
administrator functionality is enforced by the system itself. A PEP is implemented and is called 
whenever a policy is trying to be removed, added, or modified. XACML policies were written and 
placed on the system before the PAP functionality was added and can also be managed by the PAP 
the same way as any other policy. This therefore brings the functionality of the system "full circle" 
as it can be said that it is an Access Control framework which enforces Access Control on itself.  
4.3 Integration	scenarios		
 This section will describe two possible ways that the solution is predicted to be utilized in 
order to enforce access control in a target system. It will also provide a critical overview by 
presenting security issues and threats, and proposing solutions for solving those issues. These 
scenarios have some common characteristics and requirements but also differ in the benefits they 
offer and issues that need to be dealt with. The scenarios that are shown are not the only 
possibilities but were determined to be the best ones as explained in subsections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5. A 
discussion regarding scalability and possible distribution over more machines, along with other 
issues will be given later in this subsection. 
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4.3.1 Integrated	solution	
 
Figure 23. Integrated solution scenario schema 
 In Figure 23. the schema of the "Integrated solution" scenario can be seen. It is the first of 
two integration scenarios and it requires that the target system has a Redis database running and 
available to be used by the Access Control component. As the solution is completely integrated in 
the target system, it allows the solution to be configured very precisely for the target system. The 
implementation of the PEP is done by providing it with a request and an object responsible for 
fetching the resource. This removes the responsibility of decision making process from other 
entities and is a "clean way" of enforcing access control compared to relying on the target system 
to make the correct decision depending on the evaluation result. Other that providing and 
configuring the Redis database for storing policies additional configurations depend on the needs of 
the target system as these additional components are not strictly necessary as explained in 
subsection 4.2. If the system requires fetching of attribute data from external sources e.g.: subject 
attributes for an internal or external data source a PIP needs to be configured to connect to that 
system and fetch the required data. The same applies to fetching resource data from a database 
containing resource data. As connections to outside sources and connections made directly to the 
resource for getting resource attributes are a security issue, these matters have to be dealt with. This 
matter will be analyzed in more detail later in this Section. The administration entry point is a 
simple Web App that offers functionality for managing the policies. Also, the access to this 
functionality is secured and managed by using the same PEP as the Access Control system enforces 
access control over itself.  
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4.3.2 Using	the	solution	as	a	service	
 
Figure 24. Schema of using the solution as a service 
 Figure 24. shows the architecture of the second integration scenario. The main difference 
between this one and the first one is that the Access Control system is not integrated into the Target 
System, but is now being called from outside through a REST service. For basic use this scenario 
requires minimal configuration and unlike the first one, it does not require a Redis database for 
storing policies. In this scenario the Access Control Service is therefore, totally detached from the 
Target system meaning that the responsibility of running and maintaining the service is removed 
from the Target system, and is mostly diverted to the entity providing the service. This makes 
integration simpler and is the main benefit over the first integration scenario.  
 The PEP that is integrated has the same interface and provides the same functionality. If it 
needs to fetch attributes from external sources, those PIPs need to be implemented and integrated in 
the Access Control service beforehand and configured to connect to the correct services in a secure 
manner. Unlike the first scenario if the Access Control needs to fetch resource attributes the Target 
System needs to provide an end point (connection for a REST service) that provides a method for 
fetching resource attributes.  
4.3.3 Comparison	
 The integration scenarios share some characteristic and differ in others. The main 
difference is in the fact that the first one is a locally integrated solution while the other is using the 
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Access Control as an outside service. This difference means that the first scenario is more secure 
but relies on the target system. It can be configured and modified to more precisely accommodate 
more specific uses, but requires to have a Redis database and cannot be used in the same way by 
multiple systems if they are distributed on multiple machines/locations. This scenario therefore is 
suited for closed systems that do not require connections to outside services making it more secure. 
The second scenario is simpler to integrate for a simple and basic use. It relies on the outside 
Access Control system to deliver the decision which therefore has limitations regarding 
configurations/modifications but can be monitored and updated easily and it removes a lot of the 
responsibility from the target system. It also requires an implementation of a REST service that 
provides resource attribute data. The second scenario therefore comes with the more security issues 
regarding all the external connections that eventually need to be solved and are going to be 
addressed in the next part of this Section. 
4.3.4 Scalability,	Distribution,	Security	Issues	and	threats	
 In this subsection issues are identified that were discovered while developing this security 
component and from lack of specifications in certain areas of the OASIS XACML 
standard(OASIS, 2013). These issues are addressed and solutions are proposed in subsection 4.3.5. 
 Communication between components and the distribution of components on several 
machines is not defined in the standard(OASIS, 2013)(Daniel Díaz-López, 2015). Without 
enforcing some security measures this leaves thing open to security issues with Confidentiality of 
access requests and authorization decisions. It is important to put appropriate safeguards in place to 
protect decision requests and authorization decisions from several attacks. There are several attacks 
that could be possible. Examples include(Keleta, 2005)(Daniel Díaz-López, 2015):  unauthorized 
disclosure, message replay, message insertion, message deletion and modification. Considering a 
simple scenario in a XACML-based security component or system, the PEP sends an XACML 
request to the PDP(Keleta, 2005). The standard does not define any mechanism which would 
ensure that messages were not changed during communication or that the sender and receiver are 
indeed the ones they represent to be. Without any that connection is not safe from attacks. For 
example, if an malicious party manages to gain access to the communication channel between the 
PDP and the PEP, that party would be able to intercept requests and results. This means that it 
could monitor, modify or even fake requests and responses. Effectively this means that it could 
potentially gain control over all decisions made and therefore control who gets access to resource. 
This means that it could monitor the traffic and gain insight into what is happening and collecting 
information that is potentially confidential. This unauthorized disclosure of information causes a 
compromise to the privacy of the users and the system itself.  
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 Disclosure of information such as the requestor’s identity in the decision request has a huge 
impact to the privacy of the users in the system. Appropriate safeguards should be adequately put 
into force to prevent the communication channel between the PDP and the PEP from being 
intercepted by unauthorised malicious third parties. In addition the storage mechanism for policies 
has to be protected against any unwanted connections. Connections need to be limited only to other 
components that need to access the policies (PRP, PAP). 
 These integration scenarios propose two different methods of integration but they also 
reveal some issues, mainly regarding security. As the purpose of this solution is to provide the 
means to enforce access control and therefore security, these issues must be dealt with if the 
solution is to be used. The main issues are regarding the way external attribute data is fetched. This 
is achieved through an open REST connection/service which is insecure as the client cannot be 
certain it is communicating to the right service, the service does not know if it is responding and 
sending data to the right client and also, there is no guarantee that the message was not tampered 
with. The connections that are of concern are the connection to external services providing data in 
both scenarios, and the connection between the PEP and Access Control Service, and the one 
between the Access Control Service and the Attribute providing service located on the Target 
System. These connections need to be secured in order for the system to be secure.  
 A simple and effective way of securing these connections and solving these issues is by 
implementing the REST services over a HTTPS connection e.g. SSL(Secure Sockets 
Layer)/TLS(Transport Layer Security). Using this method provides the authentication to both 
parties involved in the communication and protects the privacy and integrity of the data being 
exchanged between them. This would be sufficient to solve these issues because the Server and 
Clients could trust they are communicating with one another and that the messages are not being 
tampered with.  
 Other options like OAuth 2 and OpenID Connect can be used on-top of TLS and provide 
additional benefits when considering connection with other systems but this work will not go into a 
detailed analysis of those options nor TLS. The benefits include delegation of the evaluation 
process and utilizing the tokens used by OAuth and Open ID Connect when connecting to other 
systems and , for example, fetching attribute data.  
 The last issue is related to fetching resource attribute data in both scenarios. Although this 
is not necessary a security issue it has to be mentioned as it is a potential point of access through 
which sensitive data could be fetched. This point should be different than the one used normally to 
access resources and it should limit the access only to parts and data that are really needed for the 
evaluation of policies and avoid fetching large quantities of data and sensitive data. Of course, 
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depending on the policies used sensitive data has to be accessed for evaluation purposes, and the 
PDP (and therefore the PEP) will not return any additional data so it is not a true security issue. 
This is why the issue is not necessarily a security issue but has to be addressed with caution.  
4.3.5 Solving	issues	and	securing	connections	
 This subrection addresses the issues that were identified in subsection 4.3.4. 
 Regarding distribution and grouping of components, the components that should be 
grouped are: PDP, Context Handler, PRP and PIPs. These components are the essential 
components needed for evaluating the requests. Separation of these components would not bring 
any benefits, instead it would bring only connection issues and possibly diminished performance. 
The PIPs can be connected to external services and fetch attributes from outside the system but 
should not be separated. Additionally, connection points to outside components should also be 
added to this group. These would include components like web interfaces for the PAP, REST 
service components and any other component over which the communication with the access 
control service is done. Although this group is not an essential part to the evaluation process they 
are endpoints that revolve around the database containing policies. Keeping these together with the 
rest of the group means keeping communication between components simple, fast and safe without 
the need of implementing additional safety measures. The PEP needs to be on the machine that is 
integrating access control. 
 This method of grouping these components brings up issues regarding scalability. 
Normally a distributed system scales much better that a non-distributed system and if the 
components cannot be separated it is hard to have a distributed system. The solution to this would 
revolve around the replication capabilities of the Redis database used to store policies. The 
database can be replicated on multiple machines and multiple instances of the solution can run on 
all of those machines. This would then scale as needed (Daniel Díaz-López, 2015). For this to work 
with the REST service an additional component would be needed. It would have functionality for 
handling multiple instances and delegating the workload efficiently. This of course does not have 
to rely on the Redis database and can be exchanged for another storage solution if a better one is 
found. Because this can be viewed as a service for evaluating requests against policies, it is 
therefore a single "black box". 
 Along with scalability, the parallelisation of the process is an issue that has to be 
considered. This can be achieved using the same principle as before. Having multiple instances of a 
PDP and providing each one with a subset of policies and running everything parallel is an easy 
and straightforward way to deal with the parallelisation issue. Long evaluation times in the case of 
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a large set of policies can therefore be split in a fraction of the time by dividing the work and 
aggregating the result at the end. 
 Some of the issues with connections were identified in the work of (Keleta, 2005). Their 
solution was to have a centralized entity that would connect to every component over TLS and 
distribute a token and encrypt messages. This would ensure that the message is unmodified and that 
the request comes from a authorised and verified source. Because of the grouping of components 
this is somewhat unnecessary and because of the encrypting it can present unwanted overhead. 
 
Figure 25. Architecture with marked SSL/TLS connections 
 The issues in the internal communication between the PDP, Context Handler, PRP and 
PIPs are no longer an issue if those components are grouped together. The remaining connections 
that present an issue are the connection between the PEP and the Context Handler and between the 
PIPs and external sources (including the resource when fetching resource attributes). The problems 
with these connections are regarding message integrity and validity of both sides. As these 
communications are most likely be over some kind of internet connection (for example, over a 
REST service) the technology to secure them already exist and are proven to work well. A simple 
and effective way of securing these connections and solving these issues is over a HTTPS 
connection (SSL/TLS)(Daniel Díaz-López, 2015)(Keleta, 2005). Using this method provides the 
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authentication to both parties involved in the communication and protects the privacy and integrity 
of the data being exchanged between them. This would be sufficient to solve these issues because 
the Server and Clients could trust they are communicating with one another and that the messages 
are not being tampered with.  
 Figure 25 shows the architecture, distribution of components and has the SSL/TLS 
connections marked where they are required to be for a secure system. 
 Other options like OAuth 2 and OpenID Connect can be used on-top of TLS and provide 
additional benefits when considering connection with other systems but this work will not go into a 
detailed analysis of those options nor TLS as those technologies are already familiar and known 
solution for these types of problems. The additional benefits include delegation of the evaluation 
process and utilizing the tokens used by OAuth and Open ID Connect when connecting to other 
systems and , for example, fetching attribute data.  
 The solutions presented for external connection issues were not implemented in the final 
solution and are only presented as a proposed solution. The final developed solution therefore does 
not support SSL/TLS connections over developed REST services and clients.  
4.4 Development	process		
 This section will briefly describe the development process used while developing this 
solution. The process followed the methodology of building a basic and simplified version of the 
systems core early, and incrementally expand, test and refactor the existing solution until a fully 
functioning solution is reached. In the early stages of development the requirements for potential 
systems like SMARTIE were taken into account and as a result the solution's scope was 
determined. The resulting scope allowed for the solution to implement a subset of functionalities 
mentioned in the OASIS XACML standard, but allow for the solution to be expanded.  
 The solution was developed in several stages. In the initial stages the basic architecture was 
made and the databases were configured. The Database Managers were made to provide easier, 
additional control and limit the possible interactions with the databases. The databases were tested 
and an initial schema was setup for testing purposes.  
 After that, the development of the Access Control framework began. As development of a 
PDP "from scratch" was unrealistic in the timeframe intended for this work, a number of base 
projects were considered. After some consideration the AT&T git hub project (AT&T, 2014) was 
selected as a base project from which some core functionality was used. As the project was in a 
"beta" state, it lacked documentation and made the implementation, and especially the 
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configuration, very difficult. Because testing proved that some core functionality was working and 
because there were not better options available at the time, this project was chosen. The main 
functionality utilized was the evaluation functionality of the PDP and parsing functionality for the 
verifying requests and policies. 
 After the project was tested, the basic architecture of the solution was made and the 
development of components began. The first component that was built was the PDP. After an 
initial implementation was made and tested, a PRP and basic PEP were built. At this point, a list of 
basic request and policies were made. This list was used as a base, which was later expanded in 
order to test other components like the PIPs and different evaluation operations. Basic PIPs were 
made and connected to the existing components. After this was complete, a working prototype with 
all of the essential components, except the PAP, was made. The PAP was the last component made 
as it is not essential for testing purposes, as the focus of the work was on having a framework 
which would evaluate requests and policies and not for building policies and requests.  
 After running tests locally, confirming that the system is working correctly and giving 
correct responses, the next stage involved the creation of a REST service and running tests from 
other systems. The main test that will be presented was done at this stage. The last component built 
was the PAP Web Application for managing policies. The last stages of development included 
refactoring and improving the solution, expanding the list of PIPs, expanding the PDPs evaluation 
functionality and integrating and testing with other systems. The results of the testing are shown in 
section 5. 
4.5 Potential	improvements	
 At the end of subsection 4.3 a number of issues were raised regarding connections in the 
system. The developed solution at that point contained open and therefore unsecure connections to 
the REST services. These connections are a primary area of concern and have to be solved by 
implementing secure connections as explained in the same subsection 4.3.  
 Another area that would need improvement is the list of possible logical operations 
available to the PDP. The current versions does not support some operations with certain data 
types. For example: more-equal and less-equal operations are not available for date/time data types. 
This list is not complicated to expand as it consists of extending the list of classes providing that 
functionality already available in the same way as they were implemented.  
 The system also does not provide the possibility for multiple connections as it crashes in 
the case of multiple simultaneous requests. This could be solved by running multiple instances of 
components and/or having a buffer for requests. Scalability and parallelisation of the evaluation 
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process is discussed in subsections 4.3.4, 4.3.5 . Improvements would require running multiple 
instances of the system or multiple components of the PDP and having additional components 
handling and delegating the workflow efficiently. This would make the solution scalable and make 
the evaluation process run in parallel.  
 The last improvement would be to provide the functionality for having multiple clients 
using the same service and distinguishing the policy lists used for everyone. This also applies for 
the PAP interface. This way of using the system could bring issues with the Redis database and its 
memory limitations. This issue could be solved by hosting the service on machines with sufficient 
memory and/or having a different way of storing policies. The closest replacement in that case 
would be CouchDB. Performance issues with scaling should not occur as all of the internal 
components can run as multiple instances and replication characteristics of Redis are sufficient.  
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5 Proof of concept 
 This section will describe the test scenarios that were created to test the system and  the test 
results will be presented. Along with that a description of a possible integration in SMARTIE and 
SCoT (smart cloud of things) will be given.  
 IoT applications are the systems that this solution was developed for. The solution can be 
integrated and used by other applications but IoT applications, and more specifically SMARTIE, 
will be considered as the main target system.  
5.1 Testing	
 In this subsection the test Scenarios will be described and test results will be shown and 
explained. The tests were designed to test the functionality, validate that the system is working as 
intended and to test the performance characteristics. Also, both integration scenarios that are 
described in subsection 4.3 were used to verify that they work and to make a performance 
comparison. The tests for the second integration scenario ("Integration as a service scenario") were 
done with by making calls from a SMARTIE component and using requests and policies already 
used by the system. This was done to verify that the solution and the integration scenario are 
working as intended when utilized by another system and also because SMARTIE was the primary 
targeted use case scenario. A brief description of the component is given in subsection 5.2.  
 Two types of tests were performed on every test scenario. The first was a qualitative test 
running a variety of requests. The goal of this test was the verification of functionality, or to put 
more precisely, verifying that the system is behaving as expected and returning the expected 
responses. The requests vary in the complexity and also on the PIPs that their evaluation requires. 
Some do not require fetching additional attribute data while others require attribute data from 
multiple sources so all aspects and components of the developed solution were tested . The second 
test was a performance type of test and it consisted of repeating requests many times, some with a 
positive and some with a negative response. The response time was timed and because the 
responses were repeated, it was possible to extract a reliable result. It also has to be noted that the 
developed solution does not incorporate any type of caching so the repetition of the requests did not 
result in inaccurate results. It also has to be noted that performance was not a primary issue or 
concern while developing this solution, therefore improving performance could be possible. The 
request that were used for testing are named with the expected result added as a suffix. This means 
that a request with the suffix "_permit" or "_allow" has the expected result TRUE and a request 
with the "_deny" has the expected result FALSE.  
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 The last thing that has to be mentioned is that these tests did not include testing of the PAP 
Web Application/interface and PAP component. This is because the PAP is not part of the 
request/policy evaluation and the test over those parts were done manually by interacting with the 
PAP Web Application.  
 After these tests, additional tests were made while integrating the developed solution in 
SCoT. As these tests were not timed and were done for the purpose of verifying that the integration 
works, these tests and their results are not included in subsections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 This is explained 
in more detail in subsection 5.3. 
 The machine used for running local tests and for running/hosting the solution as a service 
is a HP proBook 4530s with a 8,00 GB of RAM, Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2450M CPU @ 2.50GHz 
2.50 GHz processor package, running the Windows 7, 64bit operating system.  
5.1.1 Local	integration	scenario	testing		
 This scenario tested the local integration variant of the developed solution. From a 
performance perspective this is of course an ideal scenario so the results should reflect this.  
#  Name  Expected result  Result 
1  request1_Permit.json TRUE  TRUE 
2  request1_Deny.json  FALSE  FALSE 
3  request2_Permit.json TRUE  TRUE 
4  request2_Deny.json  FALSE  FALSE 
5  request3_Permit.json TRUE  TRUE 
6  request3_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
7  request4_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
8  request5_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
9  request6_Allow.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
10  request7_Allow.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
Success Percentage  100% 
Table 7. Qualitative test results of the local integration scenario 
 Table 7 shows the results of the qualitative test in the "integrated solution" integration 
scenario described in subsection 4.3.1. This was done in a local environment. This means that the 
requests were created and sent for evaluation on the same machine on which the evaluation was 
done.  
 Table 8 shows the results of the performance test done in the same environment and with 
the same integration scenario as the previous one, shown by Table 7. The results of these tests will 
be discussed in subsection 5.1.3.  
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Table 8. Performance test results of the local integration scenario 
#  Name  Expected result  Result  Response time (ms) 
1  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  60 
2  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  41 
3  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  52 
4  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  39 
5  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  40 
6  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  39 
7  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  47 
8  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  35 
9  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  29 
10  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  30 
11  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  33 
12  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  28 
13  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  27 
14  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  28 
15  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  28 
16  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  32 
17  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  35 
18  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  34 
19  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  35 
20  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  40 
21  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  34 
22  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  29 
23  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  32 
24  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  24 
25  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  28 
26  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  30 
27  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  27 
28  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  31 
29  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  29 
30  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  28 
31  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  28 
32  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  27 
33  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  30 
34  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  26 
35  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  28 
36  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  35 
37  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  33 
38  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  34 
39  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  43 
40  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  43 
         Average: 33,775 
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5.1.2 Integration	as	a	service	scenario	testing	
 This scenario tested the "Using the solution as a service" integration scenario. The 
connection was done over a local network so the client and server machine had a direct connection. 
This scenario therefore does not take into account latency and other issues which would occur with 
a more realistic connection scenario. 
#  Name  Expected result  Result 
1  request1_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
2  request1_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
3  request2_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
4  request2_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
5  request3_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
6  request3_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
7  request4_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
8  request4_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
9  request5_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
10  request5_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
11  request6_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
12  request6_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
13  request7_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
14  request7_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
15  request8_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
16  request8_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
17  request9_Permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE 
18  request9_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
19  request10_Permit.xml TRUE  TRUE 
20  request10_Deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE 
Success Percentage  100% 
Table 9. Qualitative test results of the "Using the solution as a service" integration scenario 
 Table 9 shows the results of the qualitative test in the "Using the solution as a service" 
integration scenario described in subsection 4.3.2 The evaluation was done on the same machine as 
in the tests shown in subsection 5.1.1, but the requests were created on a separate machine and sent 
via a REST call. 
 Table 9 shows the results of the performance test done in the same environment and with 
the same integration scenario as the previous one, shown by Table 9. The results of these tests will 
be discussed in subsection 5.1.3.  
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Table 10. Performance test results "Using the solution as a service" integration scenario 
#  Name  Expected result  Result  Response time (ms) 
1  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  55 
2  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  58 
3  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  72 
4  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  99 
5  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  80 
6  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  79 
7  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  86 
8  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  102 
9  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  127 
10  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  85 
11  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  118 
12  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  75 
13  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  83 
14  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  132 
15  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  121 
16  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  73 
17  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  57 
18  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  58 
19  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  72 
20  request_permit.xml  TRUE  TRUE  59 
21  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  50 
22  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  46 
23  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  50 
24  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  75 
25  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  49 
26  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  48 
27  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  57 
28  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  51 
29  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  39 
30  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  47 
31  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  59 
32  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  60 
33  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  48 
34  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  58 
35  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  56 
36  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  43 
37  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  48 
38  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  47 
39  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  65 
40  request_deny.xml  FALSE  FALSE  47 
         Average: 68,35 
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5.1.3 Test	results	
 The qualitative tests in both scenarios show that the system performs as predicted. These 
also validate that the fetching of additional data worked. It can be concluded that the PIPs and all of 
the other components are working as intended, of course, from a functional perspective.  
 The performance tests show that the second scenario has double the response times 
compared to the first one, which is to be expected because of the overhead a REST service scenario 
introduces. This difference in response time should increase in situations where the machines are 
further away from each other, with high network traffic and other network related problems. 
 These tests showed that the developed solution performed as intended from a functional 
perspective and satisfactory from a performance perspective, meaning that the overhead for the 
response times is acceptable for integrating in other systems. The tests that were done by making 
calls from the SMARTIE component were also a "proof of concept" test as the primary targeted 
system was SMARTIE. As the test show, the solution performed as predicted using requests and 
policies from the target system. 
5.2 Integration	with	SMARTIE	
 This section will give a general overview of SMARTIE and the SmartData platform from 
the information that was available. In Section 5.2.1 a brief description will be given of the state of 
the project during initial stages of doing this dissertation and Section 5.2.2 will give a critical 
overview and propose solutions that would improve upon the current implementation.  
5.2.1 Current	state	and	issues	
 SmartData is a platform that is being developed as a subsystem inside the SMARTIE 
project and it is responsible for storing sensor data and enforcing access control over the data and 
sensors. The system is being developed with scalability in mind and offers important functionality 
to SMARTIE. As the solutions for the problems this project faces are not readily available, and the 
final solution is meant to be used in systems used by many other systems and applications, using 
private and confidential data. Because of this, the system needs to provide a high level of security 
and availability.  
 In the current state, SmartData enforces access control for fetching data by encrypting data 
and allowing it to be decrypted only by users that have permission to access  it. This is done by 
using a combination of IBAC and RBAC. The policies that contain the information on which users 
can access the data are stored together with the data itself ("sticky policies"). This means that all 
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data needs to be fetched in order to evaluate the policy on it. This has a drawback in case of 
requests that result in denying access. If one user or a set of users send requests for a large quantity 
of data, for which they do not have access to, all of that data needs to be fetched, policies need to 
be extracted and evaluation has to be done on every set of data. This is a big performance overhead 
as these operations require significant time, so cumulatively it could be an opening for a DoS 
(Denial of Service) type of attack. This attack is just an example and is maybe not the only one that 
is possible. 
 Another issue is flexibility. In the case of changing access policies for old data, it requires 
fetching all the data for which the access policy needs to be changed and updating of the policies 
attached to it. In the case of having a large policies, they contribute to a significant piece in the 
actual data being stored bringing unwanted overhead to the system. The current system is not 
flexible enough to expand the functionality so it supports updating of policies. As this kind of use is 
not predicted and is not a requirement, the system is still secure because the data will not be 
decrypted unless the subject wanting to access the data has permission to do so. This system in its 
current state therefore satisfies the current needs but is not flexible enough to accommodate 
significant changes.  
 The publishing of data is done with a publish/subscribe type of workflow. Although this 
type of solution is appropriate for this type of scenario, it is somewhat limited on the type of 
conditions that can be integrated in the evaluation process. This comes back to the administration 
and system modifications usually required to accommodate complex conditions, decision making 
and also managing and updating of roles and other data depending on changes that take place with 
time.  
 Although the system is somewhat limited with flexibility and could have issues regarding 
overheads with administration, the planned product covers all of the requirements needed for it to 
function in the intended implementation.  
5.2.2 Proposed	implementation	
 As stated in Section 5.2.1, the solution developed for SMARTIE offers a good solution but 
has some potential problems, mainly regarding flexibility. This section will propose solutions for 
these issues by integrating the solution developed in this work.  
 A solution for the first issue mentioned (fetching encrypted data, "sticky policies") would 
be removing policies from the data and storing them in the policy database used by the solution 
developed in this work. The policies would need to be rewritten to have more descriptive and 
generic rules instead of regarding specific data. This would offer greater flexibility and because the 
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policies could be managed on a single point, it would remove the need to always fetch data while 
evaluating policies. It would also mean that one policy could be responsible for more sets of data 
reducing the number of evaluations required to access large sets of data. The last benefit would be 
reducing the amount of data needed to be stored because the policies would be stored on a different 
database and also because there would not be the need of making many copies of the same types of 
policies but having one instead.  
 Another solution for this issue would be simply putting a PEP on a place in the workflow 
that is before the current enforcement point. That would mean a place just before the data together 
with the policies are fetched. These policies would have a more global scope while the "sticky 
policies" would have a more individual scope, centred around the data they are attached to. This 
however means managing of two systems, which can be a significant drawback.   
 The performance tests shown in subsection 5.1.2 were done using policies and requests that 
are used by the current "sticky policies" solution and REST calls were made from that exact 
SMARTIE component. This means that the integration scenario by using the solution as a service 
was tested on this component. As the SMARTIE project is not fully developed and not in 
production, it was not a "real world" test but it tested the integration scenarios and showed that the 
system worked as predicted.  
 The second proposal would be aimed to improve the current publish/subscribe solution for 
publishing of data. By integrating the solution developed for this work into the current one it would 
gain the flexibility for having more elaborate conditions and also reduce the amount of 
management needed to make the system more secure in the long term. These integrations could be 
done with either integration scenarios described in Section 4.3 but because there is a possibility of 
sharing some policies, attribute sources and other functionality the second scenario would be easier 
to integrate and would offer an overall better solution. 
5.3 Integrating	with	SCoT	(Smart	Cloud	of	Things)	
 This section contains a brief overview of the SCoT (Smart Cloud of Things) platform, 
presents the issues that were identified and proposes a solution for those issues. This section will 
not go into detail about the architecture of SCoT, its functionalities and components, because it is 
not relevant or important to this work. Additionally, the fact that the architecture of the target 
system (in this case SCoT) can be looked at as an unknown factor is proof that the developed 
solution is flexible and can be used by a variety of target systems. This section will be focused on 
the issues discovered regarding access control, proposing a solution and describing the integration 
process and tests. 
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 SCoT is a platform used mainly for research purposes at the Instituto de Telecomunicações 
facilities in Aveiro. It is in still in its development stages and is a test bed for using sensors, 
networks, building applications on top and providing data to services.  
5.3.1 Current	state	and	issues	
 SCoT currently implements access control by giving access keys to subjects that want to 
access the data bus. Together with those keys, complex regular expressions are generated which are 
then used to check if the provided key can read from a device of publish data as a device. These 
regular expressions are hard to read and are unintuitive. This means that maintenance is not easy 
and security faults could pass unnoticed by the system's administrator. Another issue is flexibility. 
As the regular expression currently only check if the key has read/write permissions over the 
requested device, this is equivalent to a simple XACML policy. Changing the functionality and 
implementing different rules of evaluation or policies is not trivial therefore the system is not 
flexible. Distributing of keys, registering of users and devices is currently done manually. As well 
as being automated, this process has to be made secure. 
5.3.2 Integration	of	the	developed	security	component	
 Integrating the developed security component and using it as a REST service was the 
implementation scenario that was used, as it required the least effort, provided quick results and 
almost no modifications in SCoT.  
 As can be seen in Figure 26 the PEP was integrated in the Device Management component. 
This component was suited to nest  the PEP inside it because it is already used to evaluate requests. 
As it is built in Python, a library needed to be made that mirrored the one containing the RESTPEP 
and described in subsection 4.2. After the component, policies and a template for a JSON XACML 
requests were made the last step was to configure a RESTPIP to connect to SCoT and fetch 
additional resource and subject attributes. The integration was straightforward and tests were made 
to verify that the system is performing as predicted.  
 The policies that were made do not cover all of the rules and types of requests that are 
currently required to run on the system but 2 main ones were made. The first one being: a subject 
that is also the owner of a device can always perform read and write operations; and the second one 
being: a subject can perform read operations if it is not the owner of the device only when it 
provides a key for reading from that particular device. Other policies would include giving all 
permissions to a subject that is an administrator and verifying if a device can be registered but they 
weren't implemented as the goal was to provide a proof of concept. 
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Figure 26. SCoT architecture with the developed security component integrated 
 An important thing to note about this integration is that the system needed to provide the 
PEP with a request with minimum data. This data included only a key, requested action ("read" or 
"write") and a device path (string with defined path for device structured similar to a URL link). 
The Access Control Service fetched all additional attributes (permissions, device owner, key owner, 
etc.) by itself over a RESTPIP. Although, in this case, the connection for fetching additional 
attributes was done back to SCoT over a REST service, if there was a need for it, attributes could 
have been fetched from other external services. From the perspective of the Access Control Service 
SCoT is an external system/service and therefore this proves that the developed solution can easily 
be integrated into systems other than SMARTIE and is therefore not limited to one use-case.  
 This integration shows that the developed solution is easy to integrate as the coding 
modifications were minimal. The major benefits for using the developed solution are: flexibility 
and lower maintenance. Additional policies can be added without going through code or shutting 
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the system or service down. By adding additional rest connections and/or PIPs, more complex 
policies can be written and complex rules and extensive rules can be enforced. 
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6 Conclusion  
 This Section will give a brief overview and final remarks on the work that has been done 
and give thoughts and direction for future work.  
6.1 Final	remarks	
 Companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon but also other organisation like in the EU 
in case of SMARTIE, are investing a lot of time, effort and money in solving the challenges 
regarding IoT, Big Data, Access Control and Security in all of these areas. These areas are 
currently on the forefront of technological advancements and together with some other fields like 
AI (Artificial Intelligence) are considered areas that will bring the next push of advancements in 
technology in general. Security is an often an overlooked area but still needs to be addressed in 
order to make the systems safe to use. Projects like SMARTIE offer great potential for applications 
that could significantly improve people's lives and security of personal information and critical 
systems is vital to making those real. 
 The solution that has been developed, although obviously not at production level is a proof 
of concept and demonstration of utilizing ABAC and the XACML standard in a IoT scenario 
environment, demonstrating many benefits compared to other systems including: ease of 
integration, flexibility, low maintenance, etc. Along with IoT scenarios, the applications that it 
could be utilized in are numerous. Just naming one example, with web applications and the 
OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) top ten list of security issues, ABAC effectively 
solves half of them43. Therefore, a standardised and simple to use solution could solve these issues 
with ease and minimal modification having significant impact on the level of security offered by 
basic services and applications.  
 The other benefit of utilizing ABAC and XACML is also longevity. Because of the 
flexibility offered by the diversity of policies that can be written and enforced, and the open nature 
of the actual resources, security could be enforced over virtually anything from data, applications, 
services to sensors, actuators, locations... This open nature is probably the most significant 
contributor to the possible impact ABAC can offer. The solution developed in this work, as 
research indicates and unlike other solutions, implemented all of the major components defined in 
the OASIS XACML standard (OASIS, 2013). It was tested in various scenarios and offers two 
                                                     
43 Nair, S., 2015. Getting OWASP Top 10 Right with Dynamic Authorization. [Online]  
Available at: http://developers.axiomatics.com/blog/index/entry/getting-owasp-top-10-right-with-
dynamic-authorization.html 
[Accessed 22 February 2015]. 
94 Conclusion 
 
94 | P a g e   
ways of integration, and both are straightforward and simple to do. Although this solution is a 
"proof of concept" and not a final production piece of software, as the tests demonstrate, it can be 
used in the case of simpler scenarios and can be expanded for more demanding ones. 
 The ABAC methodology together with the XACML standard, has great potential and 
offers great benefits with very little to no downsides, one of which is complexity of developing a 
solution supporting the standard. This was addressed in this work by providing it as a service 
easing the migration to ABAC and XACML. A finalized open source implementation that 
implements every aspect of the standard along with connectivity options with many types of 
services, would offer great benefits for many implementations, not only IoT applications as 
mentioned before. After building and having a secure system, verifying that it works correctly and 
predictably, the potential failure point is no longer directly a point in the system but the interfaces 
that system administrator and people implementing the solution have to use. The system's security 
relies primarily on correctly defined policies, making requests that correctly mirror the true 
requests and integration that is done correctly.  
 The human aspect of enforcing security is often overlooked as it is assumed that that aspect 
will work correctly. ABAC and XACML addressed this indirectly as the implementation should 
provide a solution that needs less maintenance together with policy and request writing formats that 
are readable and understandable for humans, and all together offer significant improvements 
compared to current systems. The focus of future improvements therefore may shift from 
developing new systems from a system perspective but more to a usability, maintenance and 
human perspective in general which will be addressed in section 6.2.  
6.2 Future	work	
 The solution needs some improvements to make it usable for "real world" environments. 
Securing all of the connections for the REST services by utilizing TLS/SSL and either oAuth or 
OpenID Connect as explained in the end of Section 4.3. would be the first step in the first phase of 
improvements. Expanding the list of classes that provide the functionality for evaluation operations 
would be a secondary goal for improvements along with optimisations and adding the ability for 
handling multiple simultaneous calls in the service integration scenario.  
 After functionality and performance are expanded and improved, the focus of future work 
should be on the PAP. After the system is tested and it is confirmed that the system is working as 
intended, both from a functional and performance perspective, the only significant points of 
improvement are the PAP along with the interface for creation policies and a request parser 
component that would automatically mirror a variety of requests into JSON or XML formats of 
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XACML requests. For example, the creation of requests from regular java code calls, url requests 
or others still have to be manually converted into standardised XACML requests. This requires a 
lot of effort, mainly because it requires the person implementing the solution to learn the standard 
and therefore making a possibility of incorrect request definitions more likely. This therefore 
makes the system dependant on the fact that a somewhat complex implementation is done 
correctly.  
 An additional component that could prove to be beneficial and make integration for target 
system much easier is a request building component. The problem of creating XACML request that 
mirror "physical" request for data of services is still an issue. The purpose of the component would 
therefore be mirroring these requests in XACML requests. One significant issue for developing this 
kind of component would be supporting multiple technologies and types of requests. This is not 
addressed in the OASIS XACML standard (OASIS, 2013) but the work done in (Antonia 
Bertolino, 2012) could prove to be useful for solving this issue.  and work in this area has been 
done. It presents a methodology for automatic request generation for testing policies and 
discovering faults. 
 The improvement of the PAP interface has the same problems and as the whole security of 
a correctly implemented system relies on correctly defined set of policies, a complex interface will 
indirectly result in a less secure system. Axiomatics has some breakthroughs in this area as its 
Eclipse plug-in ALFA provides a much simpler and easier way of writing XACML policies. The 
next step beyond their plug-in would be a completely graphical interface that would be aimed more 
towards people that do not necessarily need to have an in depth knowledge of XACML or ABAC. 
As a satisfactory system is created and becomes available for easy and wide spread implementation 
the focus of future developments may shift to the human aspect of maintaining and integrating 
security systems, since even a perfect security system cannot work if it is used incorrectly. Because 
of this future systems could move towards removing the need for administration altogether and 
provide security to resources in a totally automated way.  
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